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REGULATION AND SIMPLE ARITHMETIC:
SHIFTING THE PERSPECTIVE ON
TORT REFORM
PETER L. KAHN*
In this Article, Professor Peter Kahn questions the common
assumption that removal or limitation of health and safety regula-
tion would result in significant savings to society or to regulated
industries. The presence of modern products liability law, he ar-
gues, considerably offsets the potential benefits of deregulation
and largely offsets the impact of health and safety regulation on
the economy. Furthermore, Professor Kahn asserts that the inter-
action of products liability law with health and safety regulation
has led to the overstatement of the cost of governmental involve-
ment in promoting product safety.
According to Professor Kahn, this interaction has for the
most part been ignored in prior analyses of both regulation and
tort law. He argues that empirical studies of the cost of regula-
tion have not taken the role of liability law into account, and for
that reason, have significantly overstated the true cost of
regulation.
Because the cost of health and safety regulation is largely or
entirely offset by the presence of tort law, Professor Kahn sug-
gests there are previously unexplored opportunities for reform of
governmental efforts to ensure product safety. He argues that
health and safety regulation imposes little cost on the American
economy, yet could improve the rationality and lower the cost of
the tort system. Professor Kahn posits that proposals to reduce
the role of tort law, for example through the proposed regulatory
compliance defense or through an enhanced scope for preemp-
tion, risk rendering product safety law ineffective. On the other
hand, Professor Kahn concludes that efforts to improve the tort
system by enhancing regulatory efforts avoid this risk, impose lit-
tle cost, and provide the possibility of a significantly improved
tort system.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America,
Washington, D.C. I would like to thank Linz Audain, Harold McDougall, Shim Perlmutter, and
Martin White for their suggestions and insights. I also owe a debt of thanks to Kathryn Kelly
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The number of workplace deaths and injuries [is] down in both
absolute terms and as a population-adjusted rate. How much of
this decline can be attributed to the deterrent effects of the tort
system, how much to government regulation, how much to the
regime of worker's compensation, and how much to changes in
managerial or technological culture and practices is interesting
and important to know. Something is causing it. Knowledge of
what causes desirable changes would be a valuable guide to do-
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ing even better through law reform. Without such knowledge, re-
forms are shots in the dark1
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the massive attention once focused on the high costs of social
regulation2 and the decade-long ascendancy of a presidential administration
committed to removing or limiting it,3 the political wars of the 1980s left
largely untouched direct federal regulation of health and safety.4 Indeed,
such regulation is no longer the subject of widespread political controversy.
Attention has shifted from regulation to the tort system, and to efforts to
limit its reach and stringency.5 There is a simple reason for this shift of
focus: given the existence of the tort system in its present form, health and
safety regulation imposes little or no cost on the American economy.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration (NHTSA), and a variety of other federal agencies, 6 for all their ef-
forts, have seen many of their safety rules overtaken, amplified, and
extended by modem products liability law. 7 Issues peripheral to but not
directly addressed by regulatory mandates have themselves been the subject
1. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1178 (1992).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 32-57 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Christopher DeMuth, Regulation, Productivity, and the Reagan Administra-
tion's Regulatory Program, in REGULATORY REFORM RECONSIDERED 21 (Gregory A. Daneke &
David J. Lemak eds., 1985); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Re-
view of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1075, 1075-76 (1986); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REv. 253, 254 (1986).
4. See IAN AYRES & JoHN BRArrnwArrE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 7-11 (1992); Robert W. Crandall, Whatever Happened to Deregulation?,
in ASSESSING THE REAGAN YEARS 271 (David Boaz ed., 1988).
5. See, e.g., David Frum, Sanity Is Back in Style, FORBES, Aug. 2, 1993, at 62, 62 (discuss-
ing tort reform during 1993); Gary Lee, Corporate Lobby Tries to Create 'Big Mo' on Product
Liability Bill, WASH. POST, July 29, 1991, at A9 (discussing tort reform at the federal level and
citing increase in congressional support for limitations on products liability); The Tort Move-
ment's Progress Across the Nation, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 9, 1992, at 35, 35 (discussing the accom-
plishments of the tort reform movement as of 1992).
6. The federal agencies concerned with issues of health and safety also include the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Aviation Administration,
the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, the Mine
Safety and Health Administration of the United States Department of Labor, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. The Environmental Protection Agency administers the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, which can give rise to private liability in tort. See, e.g.,
Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1503-06 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Cox v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 86-87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp.
195, 197-99 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Little v. Dow Chem. Co., 559 N.Y.S.2d 788, 788 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
7. To take just one example, courts have held that virtually all of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) pertaining to
crash protection and passenger survivability are no more demanding, and in most cases less de-
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of products liability litigation.' Although workplace safety issues regulated
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) are insu-
lated from the tort system by state workers' compensation systems, the
threat of third-party litigation against equipment suppliers imposes a con-
siderable measure of tort control over the workplace environment. 9 In gen-
eral, the safety precautions required of regulated parties to limit potential
tort liability are often as great or greater than those required by the express
regulatory mandates which they face. In addition, the potential damage
awards resulting from tort actions are considerably greater in most cases
than the civil penalties wielded by the regulatory agencies.
In many cases, therefore, the regulatory system imposes little incre-
mental cost. With or without federal mandates, most regulatory require-
ments would be met anyway because of private efforts to limit tort liability.
Indeed, the tort reform movement's expressed interest in establishing a reg-
ulatory-compliance defense10 and the newfound willingness of the federal
courts to find that federal regulatory legislation preempts state tort actions I
suggest that regulation is less costly than tort law-certainly less costly to
the regulated parties.
Empirical studies of the cost of regulation largely ignored the relation-
ship between tort law and federal regulation.12 For that reason, these stud-
ies overstated the costs of regulation, and possibly its benefits as well. As
this Article demonstrates, a correct understanding of regulatory costs-in-
deed, the understanding of costs otherwise generally used in cost-benefit,
manding, than the standards applied in products liability actions against automobile manufactur-
ers. See infra note 152.
8. See, e.g., Perry v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 957 F.2d 1257, 1259-62 (5th Cir. 1992)
(alleging the impact trigger of airbag to be a design defect).
9. Although workplace safety problems are most directly handled through the workers'
compensation system rather than through the tort system, they can nevertheless give rise to tort
litigation against equipment manufacturers. See, e.g., Wagner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 890
F.2d 652, 653 (3d Cir. 1989); Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 820 F.2d 928, 931 (8th Cir.
1987); Baughman v. General Motors Corp., 627 F. Supp. 871, 872 (D.S.C. 1985); Spencer v. Ford
Motor Co., 367 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Mich. App. 1984); Wolf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 808
S.W.2d 868, 869-70 (Mo. 1991).
10. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1555, 1574-75 (1973); Peter
Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 277, 283-85 (1985); Timothy Wilton & Richard P. Campbell, Effect of Federal
Safety Regulations on Crashworthiness Litigation, 22 TORT & INs. L.J. 554, 558 (1987).
11. For a discussion of "the current spate of cases finding preemption" and the federal courts'
recent "questionable eagerness to find preemption," see Paul Sherman, Uses of Federal Statutes in
State Negligence Per Se Actions, 13 WHTrrrmR L. REv. 831, 860, 906 (1992).
12. See, e.g., I Tim AMRIcAN LAW INSTruTE, COMPENSATrON AND LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT
AND PRocEss INJuiusS 289 (Proposed Final Report Council Draft No. 1, 1990) [hereinafter COM-
PENSATION AND LLABmrr,].
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analysis-compels accounting for the tort environment in empirical mea-
surements of the effects of regulation.
The studies of regulatory costs on which regulatory policy has been
based for a decade implicitly assumed that the institutional environment
was otherwise unchanged as social regulation was imposed during the late
1960s and 1970s. In fact, of course, the institutional environment was un-
dergoing a not-so-quiet revolution'3 in the form of a burgeoning products
liability system, which imposed costly demands on private parties. These
massive changes in tort law occurred generally contemporaneously with the
inception of modem social regulation. The methodology of these studies,
which depended on coincidences in time between the imposition of regula-
tion and changes in industry behavior, swept both sets of changes into a
single moment, measured together as one event. Thus, the measured cost of
regulations, imposed at the same time the tort environment changed, in-
cludes the cost of both the new regulations and the changes in tort law.
These measured costs are an overestimate, perhaps of considerable magni-
tude, of the actual costs imposed by the regulations alone.
One implication of this failure to account for tort law is that the antici-
pated benefits of deregulation were considerably greater than the benefits
that could actually be achieved. Because tort law became more activist at
the same time social regulation was imposed, efforts to measure the cost of
the regulation often captured the combined effect of both sets of institu-
tional developments. Yet deregulation largely focused on reversing only
one. Given the new, more activist tort environment, a loosening of regula-
tory requirements would have had little impact on the behavior of regulated
private parties. Indeed, if tort law had led private parties to take all the
precautions demanded by health and safety regulation, a loosening of for-
mal regulation would have resulted in no reduction in the costs of compli-
ance with those requirements. Yet because of empirical studies that
suggested vast costs for regulation alone, equally vast benefits were antici-
pated from deregulation. The inability to achieve those benefits through
early deregulatory efforts suggests one possible explanation for the apparent
abandonment of health and safety deregulation as a political goal.' 4
13. For a description of the development of modem products liability law in rather revolu-
tionary terms, see PETER W. HumFR, LLA.aLrrY: THE LEGAL REvoLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
19-32 (1988).
14. For a somewhat similar explanation of the failure to achieve deregulation, see Robert E.
McCormick et al., The Disinterest in Deregulation, 74 AM. ECON. Ray. 1075 (1984), which sug-
gests that deregulation offers the possibility of recapturing only the efficiency losses attributable
to regulation but not the original rent-seeking expenditures that were instrumental in creating the
regulation in the first place. The authors suggest that rent-seeking expenditures constitute most of
the costs of the regulation, and thus "there is little political support from any quarter to return to
the status quo ante." Il at 1075.
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The unintended inclusion of the costs of the developing products lia-
bility regime in estimates of the costs of health and safety regulation has led
to excessive pessimism about the costs of public intervention in consumer
markets for the purpose of enhancing consumer safety. Although estimates
of regulatory cost have included the costs of products liability law,' 5 more
recent estimates of regulatory cost of the tort system have not been compen-
sated by offsetting adjustments.1 6 Thus, we have implicitly double-counted
the costs of the tort system: they are accounted for both in cost estimates of
the tort system itself and in cost estimates of regulation. As a result, society
has an excessively negative view of public intervention as a whole, and in
particular, an excessively negative view of health and safety regulation. 17
The result has been a reduced willingness to take advantage of the
potential benefits offered by health and safety regulation. If additional
health and safety regulation has little incremental cost because it simply
duplicates the demands tort law places on private parties, we simply have
achieved the products-safety equivalent of concurrent life sentences: the
second one has little additional effect on behavior.
Though regulation has in part been superceded by tort law, however,
does not mean it is without benefit. Regulation may reduce the administra-
tive cost of achieving safer products. By reducing injuries without relying
on the relatively costly mechanism of tort law, health and safety regulation
can yield significant savings. By lending clarity to the definition of rules
15. For a discussion of the sources on which this assertion is based, see infra Part III.
16. See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN
TORT LITIGATION (RAND Institute for Civil Justice No. R-3391-ICJ, 1986); J. S. KAKALIK & R.
L. Ross, CosTs OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF
CrvlL CASES (RAND Institute for Civil Justice No. R-2985-ICJ, 1983); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL.,
VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES, (RAND Institute for Civil
Justice No. R-3132-ICJ, 1984); ANDREW SCHOTrER & JANUSZ ORDOVER, THE COsT OF THE TORT
SYSTEM, 8-11 (C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, N.Y.U. Dep't Econ., Econ. Pol. Paper #
PP-42, 1986); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72,
74-76 (1983).
17. In principle the same problem applies to estimates of regulatory benefits. However, esti-
mates of the benefits of products liability are virtually non-existent and extremely tentative. See
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY, supra note 12, at 428-87 (noting that the United States evidence in
this context is fragmentary and inconclusive).
Similarly, estimates of regulatory benefits are notoriously scarce and unreliable. See ROBERT
E. LITAN & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 9-18 (1983) ("The pre-
cise magnitudes of these benefits... are subject to a wide range of uncertainty.... The valuation
problem is especially severe when human life and limb are involved."); Howard K. Gruenspecht
& Lester B. Lave, The Economics of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, in 2 HAND-
BOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORrANIZATION, 1534-37 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989); see also ALLEN V. KNEESE, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF CLEAN AIR AND WATER 125-26
(1984) (concluding that both actual behavior and hypothetical behavior based on methodologies
have limitations and "[iotal accuracy in benefits estimation is an impossible dream").
Obviously, it is extremely difficult to double-count something that has scarcely been counted
at all.
1134 [Vol. 72
REGULATION AND TORT REFORM
and by reducing reliance on relatively inexpert juries in overseeing complex
design decisions, regulation can reduce the litigation costs and inefficiency
generated by the tort system.
Yet regulation cannot simply replace tort law, as some have urged."'
The scope of tort concerns, the level of tort remedies, and the willingness of
tort law to enforce behavioral standards when the benefits of standards out-
weigh their costs provide a level of protection that federal regulation has
been unable to provide. The analysis here suggests that we should not
abandon the tort system in attempting to reap benefits from regulatory
expertise. 19
Part II of this Article argues that the actual costs of regulating health
and safety in the American economy are small, perhaps even nonexistent,
because interaction with the tort system negates most of its regulatory ef-
fect. Similarly, deregulation in today's economy can yield only minor ben-
efits. Part HI demonstrates that the estimated costs of most federal health
and safety regulations exceed their true cost, because the typical estimation
method wrongly and unintentionally includes the costs of the products lia-
bility regime that developed simultaneously. Finally, the last section of the
Article argues that federal regulation has benefits that have not been
counted. Regulation reduces overall administrative costs in a system in
which regulation and tort law act together to achieve governmental assur-
ance of health and safety.
II. THm MARGINAL COST OF REGULATION
If there were no formal administrative regulation of health and safety,
the tort system would nevertheless provide some control over health and
safety decisions by private parties such as product manufacturers or service
providers. The cost of a regulatory program should be measured by its
opportunity cost-the additional resources expended because we have it-
against the baseline of an otherwise identical society that is free of the regu-
lation in question.2" Likewise, the benefits from removing regulations
18. See, e.g., supra note 10.
19. For a persuasive description of the disadvantages of reliance solely on regulatory stan-
dard-setting and enforcement, without the additional remedies provided by an independent tort
system, see Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability
Actions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1121, 1128-29 (1988). For a compelling example of the risks of sole
reliance on the agency regulatory process, see Bruce Ingersoll & Rose Gutfeld, Implants in Jaw
Joint Fail, Leaving Patients in Pain and Disfigured, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1993, at A-1 (describ-
ing federal Food -and Drug Administration approval process for temporo-mandibular jaw
implants).
20. See, e.g., EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACQuELENE M. BROWNING, MICROCONONMIc THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS 185-86 (1983) (explaining the concept of opportunity cost).
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should be measured by what we gain in freed-up resources by
deregulating. 2
Policymakers have long believed that regulation imposes significant
net costs on the economy, and that deregulation would therefore generate
significant benefits. The perceived high costs of regulation played a signifi-
cant role in justifying the deregulatory initiatives of the Reagan Administra-
tion22 and continue to be a target of criticism. What this critical view
does not take into account, however, is that the tort system, and in particular
the products liability regime, which most closely duplicates the concerns of
federal health and safety regulation, today offsets much of the impact of
federal health and safety regulation. By guaranteeing standards at least as
demanding as those required by regulation, state products liability law has
rendered essentially unavailable the benefits from removing or limiting ad-
ministrative regulation of health and safety.24
Federal regulation does not act as a straightforward addition to the
mandates imposed on private parties by the courts. If it did, there would be
21. Virtually all of the cost-benefit studies of various regulatory programs have relied on the
principle of incremental cost (that is, the additional resources absorbed because of the presence of
the regulation) as the appropriate cost concept, as opposed to the simple expenditure concept used
in the federal budget. See LITAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 17, at 21. As the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget has pointed out in describing the method of measuring the costs and benefits of a
proposed regulatory initiative: "Ordinarily the RIA [Regulatory Impact Analysis] should identify
several regulatory options. One option, the status quo, normally serves as the base from which
increments in benefits and costs are calculated for the other alternatives." OFIxcE OF MANAGE.
MENT AND BuoGr, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, APRIL 1,
1988-MARcH 31, 1989, at 33 (1988).
As Lester Lave, a Brookings Institution economist, has explained, in performing cost-benefit
analysis: "[Alnalysis must be incremental, constantly asking about the additional benefit to be
gained from additional resources (and similarly asking about the magnitude of benefit to be lost
from taking away some resources)." LESTR B. LAVE, Ta STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION:
DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 30 (1981).
For example, assume it costs the tort system $1,000 to deal with an accident, including the
costs of preventative efforts, the injury itself, and litigation. If, in the absence of tort, regulations
with total measured costs of $3,000 would be used with the goal of preventing that accident, then
the net addition to social costs by relying on regulation instead of tort is obviously $2,000, and
only that amount should be counted as costs attributable to the regulation. Raising the cost of the
tort approach from $1,000 to $1,250 would lower the incremental costs attributable to the regula-
tion to $1,750.
22. See, e.g., REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, supra note 21,
at 5 (noting that the institution of regulatory review process is justified because "the long-term
additive costs and structural dislocations have not been readily apparent at the time of promulga-
tion .... mhe cumulative effect of some regulatory programs has become excessively burden-
some and counterproductive.").
23. See, e.g., Kevin G. Sawen, Gore Task Force Considers Plan to Let Firms Do Their Own
Safety Inspections, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1993, at A3.
24. The consumerist spirit of the late 1960s and early 1970s led to the simultaneous develop-
ment of federal health and safety regulation and products liability law. See, e.g., Teresa Morn
Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Dec-
ade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 32, 32-36 (1982).
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a clear and simple meaning to the "cost" of regulation: the cost would be
the additional resources needed to comply with those additional require-
ments and could be counted by looking exclusively to the regulation itself
and the expenditures mandated by it. Likewise, the benefit of deregulation
would arise from freeing those same resources for other uses.
In fact, federal regulation is usually a simple addition to the mandates
imposed by tort law. Several possible interactive relationships may exist
between tort law and federal regulation, and each brings subtle complexities
to the concept of "cost" applicable to regulation.
Federal regulation, for example, may preempt the state tort baseline.
When it does, deregulation simply allows the reassertion of state tort law,
yielding little net reduction in health and safety precautions mandated by
government. If preemption occurs, the additional resources consumed be-
cause regulation exists, as compared to the resources needed to comply with
state tort mandates in the absence of the regulatory mandate, may be small
or even negative. In the absence of regulation, the demands of tort law
would spring back to fill the void left by regulation, imposing their own
costs. If preemptive regulation imposes behavioral requirements less costly
than the tort law that would fill the vacuum left by deregulation,' regula-
tion reduces the total costs to the regulated parties.2 6
Alternatively, federal regulation may simply duplicate the mandates
imposed by tort law. The standard rule that regulatory compliance is not a
defense to a tort action27 permits this result. Defendants may comply with
the more demanding tort standards of behavior.28 Furthermore, tort dam-
ages often have considerably greater bite in ensuring compliance than do
regulatory sanctions.29 If actual compliance with tort law imposes higher
25. Of course, regulation may continue to impose costs associated with reporting and other
requirements not immediately related to the implementation of safety standards.
26. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2611 (1992). Allowing state
lawsuits to proceed against cigarette manufacturers might well involve significant monetary dam-
ages awarded to many millions of potential plaintiffs, which could render the entire line of busi-
ness financially disastrous. The federal labeling requirements imposed a small cost per package
and some highly speculative reduction in demand for cigarettes.
27. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that "federal
legislation has traditionally occupied a limited role as thefloor of safe conduct"), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1324-25 (Or. 1978) (holding
that FAA approval of an aircraft design is not a defense to a tort claim based on defective design).
28. The demands of tort law are almost always greater than the demands imposed by regula-
tion. One reason that tort actions are frequently allowed despite defendants' compliance with the
formal regulatory standards is that tort remedies function much more effectively as incentives to
compliance than do the sanctions imposed by the regulatory authority. Another is the belief that it
is important to ensure that injured plaintiffs are compensated. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Corp., 577
P.2d at 1332-33 (Linde, ., concurring).
29. In the notorious MER/29 case, for example, a drug manufacturer deliberately withheld
adverse research results from the FDA. When this came to light, the FDA imposed a fine of
$80,000, the maximum allowed by law. Civil suits against the manufacturer, however, posed a
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total costs than does compliance with complementary regulations, the regu-
lation simply has no effect on private behavior and results in no additional
compliance costs. Deregulation in this instance generates no cost savings
because the regulations have little or no effect on behavior.
Regulation may also lower the administrative costs of the tort system
through the prior reduction of injuries, the reduction of evidentiary burdens,
or the de facto specification of minimum standards of care.3" If so, deregu-
lation may raise the administrative costs of the tort system, partly or fully
offsetting whatever administrative or compliance cost savings the termina-
tion of the administrative agency would yield. Calculating the value of
these offsets requires attention both to the costs of litigating individual
cases and to the overall amount of litigation potentially avoided. As the
marginal propensity to litigate increases in response to greater damages
awards, lower procedural barriers, and more hospitable substantive rules,
every injury stands a greater chance of being litigated, and thus every injury
prevented by regulation avoids potential litigation costs. If regulation pre-
vents some injuries, as the empirical evidence suggests,31 and if the increas-
ingly stringent tort system implies either an increase in the likelihood that
an injury will be litigated or an increase in the cost of litigating, or both,
then regulation generates increasing benefits in litigation avoided.3"
On the other hand, some interactions between the litigation system and
federal regulation may raise the costs fairly attributable to regulation. This
will occur, for example, if (1) federal causes of action are express or im-
plied in the federal regulatory statute, so that the regulatory statute gives
rise to litigation that would not exist otherwise; (2) federal regulatory stat-
utes stimulate litigation over statutory interpretation or administrative pro-
cedure; or (3) regulatory standards applied through negligence per se or
considerably greater deterrent to similar future behavior: the manufacturer's tort liability ulti-
mately came to between $45 and $55 million. STEVEN FREDMAN & ROBERT E. BURGER, FoRBID-
DEN CURES 17 (1976). In general, the tort system "encourage[s] manufacturers to continue
research, reveal research results honestly, monitor scientific literature, and request or issue appro-
priate warnings." Howard A. Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers for
Failure to Warn Against Possible Side Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuits From Driving Good
Drugs Off the Market, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 413, 431 (1989-90). It is not clear that the FDA
could adequately perform these tasks at current staffing and budget levels.
30. This argument is developed more fully in Part IV, infra.
31. See ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 45-74 (1986); Kath-
leen D. Zick et al., Does the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission Make a Difference? An
Assessment of Its First Decade, 9 J. CONSUMER POL. 25, 26 (1986).
32. Furthermore, a regulation may increase tort compliance because it may subject the viola-
tor to punitive damages. See Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liabil-
ity: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REv. 1, 85-88 (1992).
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related doctrine33 increase the stringency and cost of the tort system by
giving rise to liability when it might not otherwise be present.
Yet these are all relatively rare. Private rights of action under federal
regulatory statutes are uncommon.34 Challenges to statutory meaning or the
administrative procedure under which a regulation is adopted are probably
of tiny cost relative to the economic impact of the regulations themselves. 35
The impact of negligence per se, the doctrine by which a plaintiff uses the
violation of a statute or regulation36 to prove a breach of the standard of
care, is difficult to assess. Courts view some safety statutes or administra-
tive regulations as inappropriate for use under the negligence per se doc-
trine.37 Furthermore, negligence per se demonstrates violation of the
standard of care as a matter of law in only about half of the United States
jurisdictions; in other jurisdictions, the statutory violation merely serves as
evidence of breach of the reasonable person standard or creates a rebuttable
presumption that the standard was breached.31 In addition, the appropriate-
33. For example, the statutory standard may be applied as evidence of the tort standard of
care or it may create a rebuttable presumption of that standard, or a statutory standard may be used
to define a product defect for purposes of strict products liability.
34. Generally, the federal courts in recent years have been reluctant to imply the creation of a
federal cause of action by the statutes which regulate product safety. Thus, FIFRA, the FDA Act,
the MVSA, the FTC Act and the Federal Hazardous Substances Act have all been found not to
create federal liability. Only the CPSA has been the source of any dispute, but even here the
federal courts have appeared to conclude that no cause of action exists unless within the express
terms of the federal statute. Sherman, supra note 11, at 866.
35. For example, the U.S. Judicial Conference reports that some 869 civil cases were brought
in 1988 in United States district courts under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and that 29 such
cases were brought in 1988 under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMrNISTRAIVE OFFiICE OF THE UNIMD STATES COURrs 185 (1988).
36. See, e.g., Brooks ex reL Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 563-
65 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that under Pennsylvania law, violation of FDA adverse-reaction report-
ing requirement designed to protect drug users is negligence per se).
37. See, e.g., Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 178 (Wyo. 1981) (noting that regulation was
"overbroad and inflexible"). Violation may be excused for a variety of reasons. W. PAGE KEeTON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE LAw OF ToRTs 227-28 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted)
(quoting St. Louis, Iron Mountain & So. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1907)). Furthermore,
the injury must be one that the statute is intended to prevent, and the plaintiff must be a person the
statute was intended to protect. Kelly v. Koppers Co., Inc., 293 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) (per curiam); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
38. KEZrON Er AL., supra note 37, at 230. There is further reason to be skeptical of the
importance of negligence per se. Courts are typically less willing to treat violations of administra-
tive regulations as determinative of negligence than they are with statutes. Id. Federal courts
have no federal question jurisdiction over state tort claims when the only "federal question" is the
application of the federal statute for establishing the state law claim. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986). Some courts have held that the absence of an
express or implied private cause of action under the federal statute precludes the use of that statute
as the basis for a state claim of negligence per se. See, e.g., R.B.J. Apartments, Inc. v. Gate City
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 315 N.W.2d 284, 285 (N.D. 1982). This approach has not been followed in
most state courts, however. See Sherman, supra note 11, at 899.
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ness of so using federal regulations in conjunction with the negligence per
se doctrine has not often been examined by state courts. 9
On balance, the growth in importance of the tort system probably has
reduced the potential impact of health and safety regulatory requirements
on private parties. Whether regulation independently imposes costs on pri-
vate parties depends in large part on the magnitude of these interactive ef-
fects. This Article concludes that preemption and duplication have
significantly reduced incremental regulatory costs.
A. Preemption of State Tort Actions
Assessing the incremental cost of federal regulation is made more dif-
ficult when preemption occurs40 because federal regulation eliminates or
diminishes the need for compliance with state tort law; instead, federal law
substitutes an alternative set of requirements. 1 These substitute require-
39. The Prosser casebook notes, "Surprisingly, there has been very little consideration" of
whether violation of a federal statute should be the basis for finding negligence per se in state
courts. WILLIAM PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 214 (8th ed. 1988); see also
Sanchez v. Galey, 733 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Idaho 1986) (finding that violation of federal Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Administration regulations constituted negligence per se as a matter of
state law). Sanchez was a case of first impression and has to date been followed in few other
jurisdictions. Id. Federal courts have assumed in some diversity cases that the state courts whose
law they were applying would apply negligence per se to a federal statute. See, e.g., Gober v.
Revlon, Inc. 317 F.2d 47, 51 (4th Cir. 1963) (finding violation of Federal Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act as evidence of negligence per se under Califomia law); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eut-
sler, 276 F. 2d 455, 460-61 (4th Cir. 1960) (holding similarly under Virginia law).
40. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that federal statutes or regulations may preempt
state laws. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985).
41. The Supreme Court has recognized three categories of preemption.
First, in enacting the federal law, Congress may explicitly define the extent to which it
intends to pre-empt state law. Second, even in the absence of express pre-emptive lan-
guage, Congress may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation, in which
case the States must leave all regulatory activity in that area to the Federal Government.
Finally, if Congress has not displaced state regulation entirely, it may nonetheless pre-
empt state law to the extent that the state law actually conflicts with federal law.
Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469
(1984) (citations omitted). The first of these categories, often described as "express preemption,"
LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 6-25 & 6-26, at 479-81 (2d ed. 1988),
occurs when Congress explicitly declares its intent to preclude state intervention. The second,
known as "implied" preemption, id. at 497-501, is found when a
"scheme of federal regulation ... is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room [for the States] to supplement it," because "the Act of Con-
gress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject," or
because "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of [the]
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose."
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
204 (1983) (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1983);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Conflict preemption, the third type,
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ments may be more or less stringent than the state tort requirements they
supplant. Furthermore, the incentives for compliance, in terms of the seri-
ousness and probability of potential penalties, may be greater or smaller
than the comparable penalties of tort law.42
As a result, the total costs faced by the regulated parties may be higher
or lower than the costs they face in the absence of regulation. If it is less
costly to comply with the regulation than with the tort law that it preempts,
the regulation is actually a cost-saving measure that reduces the total costs
the regulated parties bear in complying with governmentally imposed
requirements.
The potential cost savings associated with deregulation in such in-
stances is significantly less than the savings'-anticipated by the empirical
work on the cost of regulation, which largely ignored the impact of tort
law.43 Furthermore, because the tort system has become considerably more
activist since these studies were conducted,' the net cost savings from de-
regulation has almost surely diminished.
One important example of this relationship between tort law and pre-
emptive federal regulation involves passenger restraint systems in
automobiles. The National Highway Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 19665s explicitly preempts any state automobile safety standard that con-
cerns "the same aspect of performance" as a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) but which is "not identical" to the federal standard.46 In
spite of this language, most automobile design decisions remain the subject
of state tort suits even when a related federal standard exists.4 7 Many
occurs when the state law conflicts or is otherwise impermissibly inconsistent with the federal
statute, which can occur when "compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when
the state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."' Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, 467 U.S. at 469 (citations
omitted).
42. Even when Congress preempts common-law actions incompatible with the federal stan-
dard, regulation often continues to rely on the compliance incentives posed by tort remedies by
allowing tort lawsuits to enforce the federal standards. See, e.g., Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942
F.2d 48, 49 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 993 (1992); Wood v. General Motors Corp.,
865 F.2d 395, 396 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990).
43. See infra Part i.
44. For a history of the changes in tort and products liability law since the middle 1960s, see
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 511-27 (1985).
45. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(1966) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988)) [hereinafter Safety Act].
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988).
47. The reason is the so-called "savings clause," which provides that persons otherwise liable
under state common law are not exempted from liability by virtue of compliance with a safety
standard issued under the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1988). Most courts, in interpreting the
interaction between § 1392(d) and § 1397(c) have concluded that express preemption is not in-
tended. Instead, the Safety Act is "intended to be supplementary of and in addition to the common
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courts have held, however, that FMVSS 208, the federal safety standard
mandating that automobile producers equip their cars either with certain
types of seatbelts or with airbags, preempts state tort actions premised on
the manufacturer's failure to provide airbags.48
Courts are divided as to whether the respective states would, in the
absence of FMVSS 208's preemptive effect, recognize a cause of action for
failure to install airbags. Recent caselaw suggests that at least some juris-
dictions would impose liability on this basis.49 Because of federal preemp-
tion, however, courts have not allowed suits against manufacturers to
proceed to the determination of whether a failure to include an airbag in an
automobile in fact constitutes a design defect. Absent the preemptive effect
of the federal safety standard, automobile manufacturers might face signifi-
cant liability for failing to equip vehicles with airbags. Had they faced such
liability, as several courts have noted, they might have been effectively
compelled to include airbags because of the potentially enormous financial
law of negligence and product liability." Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 506
(1968). See generally Ellen L. Theroff, Note, Preemption of Airbag Litigation: Just a Lot of Hot
Air?, 76 VA. L. REv. 577, 577-626 (1990) (analyzing arguments for and against preemption of
common-law airbag suits).
48. This ambiguous statutory scheme has not resulted in preemption of most Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs), because those standards have typically been phrased as sim-
ple minimum requirements. Thus, state tort requirements that exceed the FMVSS in stringency
have not been regarded as in conflict with the federal standard. FMVSS 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208
(1989), which mandates passenger restraint systems in automobiles, specifically allows automo-
bile manufacturers to choose between airbags and seatbelts. Id. Many federal courts, therefore,
have interpreted this standard as impliedly preempting design defect claims against automobile
manufacturers premised on a common-law duty to include airbags. See, e.g., Pokorny v. Ford
Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990); Kitts v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065; Taylor v.
General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 826 (1lth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990);
Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 408 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065
(1990); Kalbeck v. General Motors Corp., 756 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (S.D. Ind. 1991); Dallas v.
General Motors Corp., 725 F. Supp. 902, 905 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Surles v. Ford Motor Co., 709 F.
Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (D.S.D.
1987).
49. Because the preemptive effect of federal regulation has not been definitively resolved,
some courts have reached the question of whether state law would recognize such a claim. Taylor,
875 F.2d at 818 (holding that an automaker's failure to equip a car with an airbag could serve as
basis for tort liability under Florida law); Staggs v. Chrysler Corp., 678 F. Supp. 270, 273 (N.D.
Ga. 1987) (same under Georgia law). But see Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 656 F.2d 960, 960 (4th
Cir. 1981) (holding, under North Carolina law, that automobile manufacturer was not liable for
defects in design that merely aggravated injury); Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., 677 F. Supp. 76, 85
(D. Conn. 1987) (stating that Connecticut tort law would not recognize a suit against automaker
for failure to install airbags); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (E.D. Mo.
1986) (holding same under Missouri law); Higgs v. General Motors Corp., 655 F. Supp. 22, 26
(E.D. Tenn. 1985), affd sub. nom. Thomas v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 815 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding same under Tennessee statute).
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liability from failing to do so.5 0 Because manufacturers resisted voluntarily
installing airbags in vehicles and fought vigorously against attempts to
make airbags mandatory,"' it would appear that airbags impose considera-
bly greater costs on manufacturers than the seatbelt alternative also avail-
able under FMVSS 208.52 Apparently, then, the requirements that state tort
law would impose in the absence of federal regulation considerably exceed
the federal requirements in terms of stringency and cost.
However, if NHTSA simply chose not to address the issue of
airbags-that is, if it simply "deregulated" that decision 53-the preemptive
effect of that federal standard would vanish, and those states allowing a
failure to provide airbags to support a crashworthiness claim could experi-
ence a sudden flood of cases. 4 Removal of the federal regulation, there-
fore, would leave the states free to impose an airbag requirement via tort
law or state administrative regulation. Because of the substantial scale
economies of production in automotive manufacturing, adopting an airbag
requirement in only a few states could have a nationwide impact. Ironi-
cally, then, terminating a federal regulation could ultimately impose consid-
erably more costly obligations on manufacturers.
50. See, e.g., Schick, 675 F. Supp. at 1186 ("A single recovery on an air bag claim would
send a signal to all automobile manufacturers that they must install air bags to avoid potential
liability.").
51. The long history of the struggle to mandate airbags in automobiles is chronicled in Motor
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34-38 (1983), in which the
automobile manufacturers' trade association defended the Department of Transportation's deci-
sion to rescind the passive restraint requirement in 1981, see id. at 30-34, and in State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 680 F.2d 206, 208-18 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
52. Cost considerations played a significant role in the resistance to the passive restraint
standard. When Secretary of Transportation Andrew Lewis reopened the passive restraint
rulemaking proceeding in 1981, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1981), an action that resulted in the stan-
dard's delay, he based his decision in part on "the fact that economic circumstances have changed
since the standard was adopted in 1977," and on "the difficulties of the automobile industry." Id.
He cited high unemployment, "very depressed" sales, and significant financial losses by the do-
mestic manufacturers as reasons for reopening the rulemaking proceedings. Id.
53. The Department of Transportation, NHTSA's parent agency, in fact did exactly that in
1981 when it delayed the passive restraint standard altogether. 49 C.F.R. 571.208 (1981); 46 Fed.
Reg. 21172 (1981); id. at 21205. Its effort did not succeed because it failed to "supply a reasoned
analysis" explaining the rationale for its decision. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57.
54. The preemption of state airbag requirements arises from the peculiar form that FMVSS
208 assumes. Despite the presence of a general preemption provision in the Safety Act, the courts
have held that most FMVSSs have no preemptive effect because they are phrased as minimum
standards, which state requirements are free to exceed in stringency. FMVSS 208 differs, how-
ever, in that it explicitly offers an option to manufacturers not to include airbags, and thus the
failure to include airbags in autos cannot give rise to state liability without conflicting with the
federal regulation. See Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 401-02 (1st Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990).
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Some of these airbag cases would almost surely succeed if courts
could apply current tort law. The preemptive effect of FMVSS 208 gener-
ally has prevented juries from reaching the question of whether the absence
of airbags constitutes an automobile design defect. In areas of automobile
safety in which preemption has not been an issue, however, acceptable
crashworthiness doctrine has become a legal standard of considerable influ-
ence since it was accepted in 1968.55 Safety concerns that once were
treated only by FMVSSs have become the subject of products liability ac-
tions that rely on the crashworthiness doctrine to impose liability on manu-
facturers for defective design.56 Removal of the airbags/seatbelts FMVSS
would raise the standards imposed on manufacturers in those states in
which crashworthiness liability based on an airbag theory is allowed. Re-
moval would have essentially no effect, however, on the standards facing
manufacturers in states not permitting airbag litigation. 7
The trend in the federal courts suggests that preemption is an increas-
ingly available defense to tort defendants. Traditionally, preemption has
55. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 498-506 (8th Cir. 1968).
56. State tort law routinely places more stringent demands on automobile manufacturers than
do the related federal requirements. See infra text accompanying note 170. The proposition applies
generally in all areas of products liability. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442,
446-49 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying Maryland law in an aviation suit); Salmon v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975) (applying North Carolina law in a drug manufacturing
case); Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Ist Cir. 1973) (applying New
Hampshire law in a clothing manufacturing case).
Virtually all of the FMVSSs, except FMVSS 208, have been equalled or exceeded by safety
standards applied in products liability litigation against automobile manufacturers. See supra note
7 and infra note 152.
57. The preemptive effect of regulation also protects tobacco manufacturers from potentially
costly tort liability. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992), the Supreme
Court held that Congress preempted causes of action based on the manufacturers' failure to warn
by mandating federal warning requirements for cigarette packages. Id. at 2625. However, the
Court also held that express warranty claims, fraudulent misrepresentation claims premised on "a
general duty not to deceive," or conspiracy, were not preempted by the 1969 Act. Id. at 2622-25.
In the absence of any preemptive effect of the federal statutes, cigarette manufacturers might
well be found liable on claims based on failure to warn, as well as on other common-law theories.
The presumed preemptive effect of the federal cigarette labelling requirement has long protected
tobacco manufacturers from a potential flood of litigation. See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co.,
926 F.2d 1217, 1222 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992) (holding that
the 1965 Act preempted failure to warn and intentional misrepresentation claims); Pennington v.
Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the 1965 Act preempted failure
to warn and improper advertising claims); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230,
234-35 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the 1965 and 1969 Acts preempted failure to warn claim);
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626-27 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding that 1965 Act pre-
empted a failure to warn claim and breach of express warranty claim); Stephen v. American
Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (finding that 1965 Act preempted a
failure to warn claim); Forster v. R. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 658-60 (Minn.
1989) (finding a failure to warn claim preempted, but strict liability, design defect, misrepresenta-
tion, and breach of warranty claims not preempted unless such claims were premised on a specific
duty to warn).
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had limited power to affect state torts cases because of a longstanding pre-
sumption against preemption of state common-law damages actions .5  Ci-
pollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on the subject of preemption of state tort law, purports to
maintain that presumption.5 9 Nevertheless, a growing number of cases in
the lower federal courts suggest the rationale of Cipollone may expand the
preemptive power of federal regulation.
In Cipollone, the Court found that tort claims against cigarette manu-
facturers based on inadequacy of manufacturers' warning labels, advertis-
ing, or promotional materials with respect to the dangers of smoking were
preempted by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.60 The
decision turned on statutory language stating:
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or pro-
motion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in con-
formity with the provisions of this Act.6 '
A majority of the Court62 chose to treat a state law tort rule potentially
giving rise to damages as a "requirement or prohibition" within the meaning
of section 5(b) and thus was preempted under the federal law.63 In so hold-
ing, the Court resolved a controversy over the nature of tort judgments dat-
ing back to San Diego Building Trades v. Gorman.' In Gorman, the Court,
in dictum, treated a state damages award as regulatory in nature and thus
subject to preemption by the statute at issue. 5 In other contexts, however,
the Court has held that a jury's award of punitive damages does not consti-
tute a form of state regulation. 6
58. "Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause start[s] with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by... Federal Act
unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617 (quot-
ing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
59. Id. at 2618.
60. Id. at 2621-22, 2625; Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1988)).
61. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621-22 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking and Advertis-
ing Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b) (1988))).
62. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor joined this portion of Justice
Stevens's opinion. Id. at 2613. In addition, Justices Scalia and Thomas expressly agreed that "the
general tort-law duties petitioner invokes against the cigarette companies can, as a general matter,
impose 'requirement[s] or prohibition[s]' within the meaning of § 5(b) of the 1969 Act." Id. at
2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 2630.
64. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
65. Id. at 247.
66. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 186 (1988); Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 241 (1984).
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The Supreme Court's other major preemption opinion of the 1992
term, Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,67 buttresses Cipollone's
sweeping impact. In Morales, the Court interpreted a provision of the Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978 that preempted any state law "relating to
rates, routes, or services" of any air carrier.6" The Court held that the
statute preempted state laws which were enacted to ensure that airline ad-
vertising fully informed consumers of actual airfare terms by specifying
certain physical characteristics of advertisements.69 The Court stated that
the evident goal of the preemption provision was to ensure that "the States
would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own."7 0 To
find a conflict with this federal purpose, the Court interpreted the phrase
"relating to" as having "a broad preemptive purpose"7 1 that reached even a
state law which had only the most trivial relationship to the setting of
airfares. The Court thus made clear that it understood the phrase "relating
to" to have a "broad preemptive purpose."72
These decisions have already extended the reach of federal preemption
in at least two areas, and have the potential to reach further still.73 The
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act74 was amended by the Medical De-
vice Amendments of 197675 (MDA) to require pre-marketing approval from
the Food and Drug Administration for medical devices the FDA classified
as "present[ing] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury."76 The
MDA also includes a preemption provision, which states in pertinent part:
67. 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
68. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
69. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2034.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2037.
72. Id. The Court apparently did not feel compelled to demonstrate any connection between
the state consumer protection law and airfares beyond the statute's explicit requirement of full
disclosure or airfare terms. Nevertheless, the Court offered a curious economic defense of the
relationship between state advertising guidelines and the deregulatory purpose of the Airline De-
regulation Act. Noting that "[a]dvertising serves to inform the public of the ... prices of prod-
ucts and services," id. at 2039 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)), the
Court suggested that state efforts to ensure that advertising accurately inform consumers of prices
actually hindered this goal. Id.
73. Language similar to that interpreted in Cippollone and Morales appears in 21 U.S.C.
§ 343-1(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (preempting state law regulating food); 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(A)
(1988) (providing state requirements for testing of toxic substances); 7 U.S.C. § 228c (1988) (pro-
viding requirements that meatpackers post bonds or comply with prompt-payment provisions of
state law); 21 U.S.C. § 678 (1988) (providing state requirements for meat inspection facilities);
and 49 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4)(A) (Supp. m 1991) (requiring state control of transportation of haz-
ardous materials).
74. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988).
75. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k (1988).
76. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(ll) (1988).
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No State ... may establish or continue in effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any require-
ment applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device
or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable
to the device under this Act.7
7
In determining whether Congress intended this provision to preempt
state law claims against makers of medical devices, courts have relied on
the view that a "requirement" might not include common-law actions. 78
Combining this possibility with "the assumption that the historic police
powers of the states were not to be superseded by federal law unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress, '79 courts have concluded
that Congress did not intend preemption. Because the Supreme Court sug-
gested in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.80 that the absence of a federal
remedy weighs against an inference of a congressional preemptive purpose,
the absence of a remedy provision in the MDA heightened the obstacles
facing any preemption claim.8' The presumption of the lower federal
courts that the MDA lacked preemptive effect has resulted in substantial
settlements in favor of plaintiffs injured by FDA-approved medical
devices.8 2
Cipollone appears to have reversed that interpretation of the MDA. In
King v. Collagen Corp., 3 the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
MDA preempted the plaintiff's strict liability, breach of warranty, negli-
gence, misbranding, failure to warn, and fraud claims because each would
enforce a "requirement" against the manufacturer "different from, or in ad-
dition to," requirements enforced by the FDA.84 In Stamps v. Collagen
Corp.,8 5 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also found that the MDA pre-
empted all of the plaintiff's common-law claims, including inadequate la-
beling, failure to warn, and defective design and manufacture, 6 because
each "constitute[d] a requirement different from, or in addition to,"'8 7 those
77. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1988).
78. See, e.g., Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 668 (D. Md. 1989).
79. Id. (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
80. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
81. Id. at 251 ("Ii-]t is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all
means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.').
82. See, e.g., An Invincible Shield for Medical Manufacturers, Bus. WK., Aug. 9, 1993, at 73,
73 (discussing 1992 settlement for $500 million by manufacturer of defective heart valves).
83. 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993).
84. Id. at 1134-36.
85. 984 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993).
86. Id. at 1422. The court did not analyze the plaintiff's fraud claims because, in the court's
view, the complaint inadequately stated the cause of action. Id. at 1422 n.5.
87. Id. at 1421.
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the FDA imposes in the course of its product approval process. 88 The court
concluded, based on Cipollone, that, for preemption purposes, there is "no
distinction between positive enactments and common law."89
Furthermore, the effect of preemption under the MDA is considerably
more sweeping than in Cipollone. In Cipollone, the plaintiff was left with
several causes of action to pursue against the defendant cigarette manufac-
turers because not all of the state-law claims were "with respect to the ad-
vertising or promotion" of cigarettes.90 In the cases involving the MDA,
however, virtually any claim appears to enforce a "requirement," and thus,
as these cases have shown, is preempted.91
As does Cipollone, Morales presents a very broad interpretation of the
statutory preemptive language, and its impact reaches well beyond the stat-
ute under examination there. For example, Morales speaks directly to the
language of the Medical Devices Amendments. 92 The MDA's preemption
provision sweeps within its reach any state requirement that "relates to the
safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device under this chapter."93 Given the
"sweeping interpretation" 94 of the "relating to" language in Morales and the
decision to treat state common-law damages actions as "requirements" for
preemption purposes, it is difficult to imagine any damages claim that could
survive preemption. For all practical purposes, there apparently is no
longer any remedy under state law (or anywhere else) for persons injured by
an FDA-approved medical device. Since the MDA itself contains no rem-
edy provision, persons injured by an FDA-approved device appear to have
no legal recourse.
Cipollone and Morales have had a similar effect on the preemptive
power of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
FIFRA provides that a state "shall not impose or continue in effect any
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2620 (1992)). Similarly,
in Reiter v. Zimmer, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 199, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), the court adopted the same test
for preemption in MDA cases employed by the First and Fifth Circuits, and applied the same
rationale based on the test enunciated in Cipollone. Id. at 203.
90. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621. The Court held that the 1969 Act preempted failure to
warn claims and any claims based on the assertion that advertising or promotion of the cigarettes
tended to neutralize the federally mandated warnings. Id. at 2621-23. Express warranties, inten-
tional fraud, misrepresentation, and conspiracy claims were not preempted by the 1969 Act. Id. at
2622-25.
91. See King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1134-36 (1st Cir. 1993). The "requirements"
language in the MDA is not limited in its reach against safety claims by subsequent restrictive
language, as is the language in the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 73-91.
93. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
94. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1422 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86
(1993).
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requirements for labelling .. in addition to or different from these re-
quired" by the EPA, the regulating agency under FIFRA. 5 Prior to Cipol-
lone, courts generally did not regard this provision as preempting state
damages actions resting on inadequate labeling or failure-to-warn theories,
because a state finding of liability for damages did not constitute a "require-
ment."96 Since Cipollone, however, the cases have clearly reached a con-
trary result. Courts deciding FIFRA cases since Cipollone have held that
the statute preempts state common-law claims based on the adequacy of
EPA-approved labels, because a state tort decision that labels were inade-
quate would constitute a "requirement... in addition to or different from"
the federally approved label.97
Deregulation almost certainly would end the preemptive effect of these
federal statutes. Preemption can occur in one of three ways. First, the lan-
guage of the federal statute or regulation can expressly mandate preemption
of state tort actions. 98 Second, federal regulation may so occupy a legisla-
tive field "'as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it."' 99 Finally, the regulatory scheme may "ac-
tually conffict[ ]" with the state law such that compliance with both is im-
possible."' 0 In any of these situations, it is difficult to see how the
regulatory program's preemptive effect could survive the termination of the
regulatory program itself or even, in most cases, any serious restriction of
the program or limitation of particular regulations promulgated by the regu-
latory agency.
If preemption were based on express language in the federal statute or
regulation, as with the two cigarette labeling acts and FIFRA, then repeal or
termination of the federal law would terminate its preemptive effect.
95. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).
96. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). Although only the D.C. Circuit had ruled on the question in 1984, id.,
the federal district courts split on the question of the preemptive effect of FIFRA prior to Cipol-
lone. Cases finding preemption include: Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D.
Mo. 1990); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Herr v.
Carolina Log Bldgs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 958, 961 (S.D. Ind. 1989); and Kennan v. Dow Chem.
Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 807 (M.D. Fla. 1989). Cases in which no preemption was found include:
Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Stewart v.
Ortho Consumer Prods., No. 87-4252, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3391, at *16 (E.D. La. Mar. 26,
1990); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); and Wilson v. Chevron
Chem. Co., No. 83 Div. 762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986).
97. Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1140 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Casper v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 903, 907 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
98. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
99. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
100. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983).
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Although Congress could retain a preemption provision while terminating a
regulatory program, it is unlikely that it would do so. 101 Indeed, the case
for deregulation has been based on the premise that the common law could
more adequately and efficiently control the problem in question, an out-
come incompatible with preemption of common-law actions.102
The situation appears to be the same with respect to the other bases of
federal preemption. If there is no federal statute, there is no basis on which
the courts can imply preemption, because implied preemption rests on the
existence of a statute. 10 3 The courts are generally unwilling to imply fed-
eral preemption of state tort activity"° and would have increasing difficulty
finding congressional intent to preempt state law as the reach of federal law
diminished. Similarly, federal preemption may be based on a congressional
intent that the federal government's activities occupy the field; when Con-
gress removes federal control, it becomes difficult to argue that Congress
intended federal activity to occupy the field so extensively that the actions
of other authorities would be inappropriate.
If deregulation occurred regarding the MDA, the agency's interpreta-
tion of the statute makes clear the impact of that event on the preemptive
effect of the MDA. According to the FDA, "The phrase 'or in addition to,
any requirement applicable under the Act to the device' means that an FDA
101. Preemptive provisions in regulatory statutes are typically designed to ensure that no state
law interferes with the achievement of the federal purpose. Once the federal program is gone,
there presumably is no federal program with which to interfere. See, e.g., Wisconsin Public Inter-
venor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2482-84 (1991) (expressing reluctance to find implied preemp-
tion of local regulation when the federal statute has left the relevant portion of the field "vacant").
Likewise, express preemption obviously requires some explicit statutory language. See id. at 544
("Mere silence .. . cannot suffice to establish a 'clear and manifest purpose' to preempt local
authority."). Maintaining the preemptive effect of an abandoned federal regulatory effort would
require a congressional decision that an area of private activity once regarded as inadequately
controlled by state tort law to the extent that a federal regulatory program was required to supple-
ment it, should now be deregulated not only at the federal level, but also to prevent any control at
the state level, even to the extent of preventing the provision of compensation to individuals for
injuries caused by the presumably risky activity.
102. See, e.g., PicHADa A. PosNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 523-24 (4th ed. 1992).
103. See supra note 101.
104. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); see also California Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987) ("[P]reemption is not to be lightly presumed."); City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-13 (1981) ("The enactment of a federal rule in an area
of national concern, and the decision whether to displace state law in doing so, is generally made
not by the federal judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people
through their elected representatives in Congress."); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352
(1966) (stating that state laws "should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and
substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect
for such state interests, will suffer major damage if the state law is applied"); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that courts should "start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress").
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requirement must exist before preemption can occur."' 5 The agency's
construction of the statute will control "'unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.'- 10 6 Thus, an agency decision not to im-
pose or to remove "specific counterpart regulations" arguably would termi-
nate any preemptive effect of the statute. To the extent the agency chooses
not to enact "specific counterpart regulations," state tort law would again be
available to plaintiffs. Deregulation would offer few benefits to medical
device manufacturers, because agency deregulation would simply allow the
reassertion of state tort "requirements."
The small or even negative cost of regulations with preemptive effects
should not be surprising. Preemption is highly prized by potential tort de-
fendants because the blessing of federal regulation protects them from the
yawning maw of potentially vast tort liability."°7 To regard regulation as
having significant costs to defendants in such circumstances is clearly
wrong.10 8
Deregulation, then, may on balance result in a higher level of compli-
ance costs than the federal regulatory program had imposed. If state law
would entail more costly demands than the federal regulation it would re-
place, regulation may reduce the costs that fall on the regulated private par-
ties. Whether preemptive regulation is socially desirable is, of course, a
more complex question; the answer depends in part on whether the incre-
mental requirements of tort law yield benefits in improved health and
safety, and in part on whether tort law offers any administrative efficien-
cies. It is clear, however, that the cost to society of such regulation may be
little or none.
105. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,661, 18,662 (1978). Similarly, 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) states:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the [FDA] has established
specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a
particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local
requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific
[FDA] requirements. There are other State or local requirements that affect devices
that are not preempted by section [360k(a)] . . . because they are not "requirements
applicable to a device" within the meaning of section [360k(a)] of the act.
Id.
106. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1421 n.2 (5th Cir.) (quoting Bowles v. Semi-
nole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993); see also
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that the interpretation of
FIFRA as not preempting state law will continue until Congress expresses a clear intent to the
contrary), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
107. See, e.g., Charles F. Preuss, Federal Pre-Emption of State Tort Actions: When and How,
DEF. Cours. J., Oct. 1990, at 434, 444 (stating that defense attorneys should raise preemption
arguments "as soon and as often as possible").
108. See, e.g., John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov.Dec. 1986, at
25, 30 (citing costs of NHTSA passive restraint standard per life saved).
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B. Duplication of Mandates
Preemption, however, is still relatively uncommon. 10 9 Absent pre-
emption, state and federal law work together to regulate a field. In the
conventional view, federal deregulation simply terminates one set of con-
trols and reduces the total compliance costs imposed on the regulated
activity.
That, however, is true only in a formal sense. The broad reach of the
tort system across virtually all aspects of product safety, and its practical
role as the regulator of last resort, allows tort liability to reach virtually
every aspect of product performance, including those for which formal ad-
ministrative regulation exists.110 When this system of dual regulation"'
exists, regulation has little cost, and deregulation yields far fewer benefits
than conventionally understood.
When both regulation and tort control the same aspect of an activity,
such as product safety, only one can be the binding constraint on private
behavior. One source of law will place the greater demands on the regu-
lated parties for virtually any aspect of performance related to product
safety; one will more successfully enforce compliance with its demands.
The demands of the other are, in effect, a lesser included set of
requirements.
When tort liability places the binding constraint on private behavior,
regulation has little incremental cost. 112  Defendants comply with regula-
tion, so to speak, along the way to limiting their tort liability. When regula-
tion presents the binding rule, the cost of regulation is again only the
incremental cost of compliance, over and above that necessitated by tort
law, and not the total cost of compliance, though total cost has often implic-
109. The Supreme Court in most areas of regulation has seemed reluctant to find preemption
of state action by a federal statute. See Project: The Role of Preemption in Administrative Law,
45 ADMIN. L. REv. 107, 124 (1993).
110. This is true except when preemption has limited the role of common-law claims. See
supra note 11.
111. For a discussion of the concurrent nature of tort and federal regulation in the area of
pharmaceuticals, see Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to
Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 Am. U. L. Rnv. 199, 204-20
(1992); Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuti-
cals, 103 HAgv. L. Rv. 773, 775-85 (1990).
112. This is not to suggest that the administrative costs of regulation are insignificant. Rather,
regulation imposes little incremental cost on private parties, in terms of their costs of complying
with regulatory requirements and the resource misallocation resulting from those expenses. Ad-
ministrative costs have largely been ignored in the analysis of the costs of regulation. As sug-
gested later in this Article, the administrative costs may play a significant role in the decision of
whether to use regulatory solutions for health and safety problems.
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itly been treated as the appropriate concept.113 To a surprising degree, the
relatively binding constraint today comes from tort law.
1. Substantive Rules of Behavior
All product risks are potentially subject to federal regulation, just as
they are subject to tort liability. NHTSA has authority to regulate and con-
trol virtually all aspects of automotive design and construction as they af-
fect the safety of the vehicle." 4 Under FIFRA, 1 5 EPA regulates pesticides
and a wide range of other chemical products."1 The FDA regulates warn-
ings, additives, testing, and quality of food and drug products." 7 Among
numerous other agencies" 8 with regulatory authority in the area of product
safety, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has the bulk of responsi-
bilities, which cover all consumer product safety issues not explicitly under
the authority of other federal agencies.' 19
Despite their formal authority, the federal agencies have chosen not to
act with respect to the vast majority of product risks. Differences between
the scope of concerns of the federal agencies and products liability law arise
largely from the inevitable selectiveness with which the federal agencies
apply their limited budgets. Regulatory agencies typically must act prior to
an actual injury; because not all injuries are predictable and because their
resources are limited, regulatory agencies typically have restricted their ac-
tivities to a small subset of potential sources of injury.'2°
113. See infra Part IV.
114. Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
115. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136gg (1988).
116. Id.
117. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675,52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1988)).
118. Among other agencies with authority over product safety issues are the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, the Food Safety Inspection Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement.
119. Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1988)).
One way to visualize the [Consumer Product Safety Commission]'s authority is to
think of the types of products found in a large shopping mall. With the exception of the
pharmacy and grocery stores (and even some items there), virtually everything in the
mall falls within CPSC jurisdiction. Congress did specifically exempt certain products
from CPSC jurisdiction, such as food, drugs (except for child resistant closure require-
ments), cosmetics, automobiles, tobacco products, aircraft, boats, and pesticides....
Most of these products are regulated by other federal agencies.
Robert S. Adler, From "Model Agency" to Basket Case-Can the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission Be Redeemed?, 41 AtMIn. L. REv. 61, 65 n.30 (1989).
120. The agencies ... have received harsh criticism for failing to set and enforce regula-
tions to prevent every unfortunate event from lung cancer deaths among asbestos work-
ers to pollution episodes. Reacting to criticism that hundreds of carcinogenic and other
toxic chemicals in the workplace are unregulated, the Occupational Safety and Health
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In contrast, state and federal courts apply tort concepts of negligence
and strict liability to virtually any product characteristic that injures a plain-
tiff. Their concerns sweep broadly across the full range of products, and
reach virtually every aspect of product performance.121 If federal deregula-
tion were to occur, state tort law would continue to exert post-hoc, presum-
ably deterrent, regulatory authority. Wherever a regulatory agency has
chosen to act, a parallel body of law covering the product performance
characteristic in question almost always exists.122
The development of tort doctrine over the last two decades has brought
virtually every aspect of product safety within the reach of tort law. 123 The
decline of tort privity124 and the ability to disclaim implied warranties, 125
which had long protected manufacturers from consumer suits in tort; the
development of the concept of design defect, 2 ' which holds manufacturers
liable for product imperfections that are not unique to individual cases but
are potentially present in every unit of the product; the rise of the doctrine
of the product warning defect,127 which focuses on the very same consumer
Administration has sought to regulate many more substances; yet redoubling its efforts
has not succeeded in increasing the number of new regulations published each year.
Similar examples can be given for each regulatory agency, since each finds that promul-
gating a new regulation requires thousands of professional man-hours and years of cal-
endar time.
LAVE, supra note 21, at 3.
121. As George Priest has pointed out:
Where the function of our courts is to internalize costs and to provide insurance, their
powers exceed those of any regulatory agency.... Our modem civil justice system...
aspires to internalize costs to all activities in the society, made within every industry,
indeed, by every citizen. Through the daily aggregation of civil damage judgments in
the thousands of state courts around the country, our courts aspire to provide fine-tuned
control of all injury-causing behavior. Our civil courts have become the most powerful
regulatory institution in the modem state.
George L. Priest, The Modem Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and Its Reform,
5 1. EcON. PERsP. Summer, 1991, at 31, 39.
122. Statutory or regulatory standards have on occasion been used to create new tort liabilities.
In Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 964-65 (E.D. Wis.), modified,
532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981), for example, the court held that the violation of an FDA
regulation requiring patient package inserts for oral contraceptives justified the creation of a new
common-law duty for drug manufacturers to provide consumer warnings. Id. at 964-65; see also
Clarence Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 21, 23
(1949) (discussing the advantages of the criminal justice system as the primary regulator of civil
responsibility). In such cases, the presence of the statute or regulation clearly exceeds the respon-
sibilities independently imposed by the tort system.
123. One barrier as yet unbreached, of course, is preemption.
124. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054-55 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1916).
125. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 84-96 (N.J. 1960).
126. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978); Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972).
127. See, e.g., Moran v. Faberge, 332 A.2d 11, 20 (Md. 1975).
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information issues that have long concerned regulators; the development of
liability that attributes responsibility for injuries to whole industries;12 the
decline of defenses relating to consumer behavior;129 and ultimately, the
redesign of tort law as the guarantor in strict liability of product safety; 30
have all made it possible for virtually any product risk addressed by regula-
tory agencies simultaneously to be addressed by the tort system. At the
same time, the doctrine of negligence per se has meant that failure to com-
ply with any governmental agency's product safety requirements may help
prove liability.13 ' Furthermore, because tort enforcement is in the hands of
injured private individuals, the activity of the tort system can reach virtually
any legally cognizable claim.132
The behavioral standards imposed by the tort system are, in the vast
majority of cases, no less stringent than those imposed by federal regula-
tion, and are frequently more stringent. This may in part be the result of the
combined effect of the doctrine of negligence per se133 and the traditional
rule that regulatory compliance is not a defense to an action in tort;134 to-
gether these imply that "federal legislation has traditionally occupied a lim-
ited role as thefloor of safe conduct."' 35 But there are more fundamental
reasons than this. For one, the enforcement efforts of health-and-safety-
related agencies have significantly declined in the last decade or so, while
the risk of litigation has increased significantly for product manufactur-
128. For a discussion of enterprise liability, see Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 933-34
(Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
129. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78 (N.Y. 1976).
130. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 44, at 462-66.
131. The inference of liability is mandatory in some states but permissive in others. In those
states where it is mandatory, negligence per se at best makes it easier to demonstrate that a prod-
uct characteristic is unreasonably dangerous, a demonstration that may independently be made
without the evidentiary simplification afforded by negligence per se. KE-oN ET AL., supra note
37, § 36, at 220-33.
132. Although only a small minority of actionable injuries actually result in legal action, there
is no reason to think that the rate of litigation from the pool of injuries differs among types of
cognizable claims. Saks, supra note 1, at 1188.
133. See KE r Er At., supra note 37, § 36, at 229-31.
134. See, e.g., Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d. 1025, 1027 (1st Cir. 1973); Burch
v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085-86 (D.C. 1976); Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 41 A.2d
850, 853 (Pa. 1945); KEaroN Er AL., supra note 37, § 36, at 233.
135. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1062 (1984).
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ers. 36 In addition, tort damages awards are typically much greater than the
penalties imposed by regulatory agencies or regulatory statutes.1 37
Most importantly, however, the basic decision criteria of the alterna-
tive systems tend to force this result. Federal agencies must use a cost-
benefit test that prevents the implementation of regulatory requirements
with costs that outweigh the benefits,1 38 but nothing compels agency action
whenever that criterion is met. Common-law courts apply a more aggres-
sive standard. Courts are supposed to find liability, in applying a negli-
gence standard, whenever the benefits of a precaution outweigh its costs
coupled with the probability that injury will occur if the precaution is not
taken;1 39 similarly, a strict liability standard gives a potential defendant rea-
son to take a precaution whenever its benefits outweigh its costs.1 40  In
136. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 116, at 77 (noting agency "has been stripped of resources to
the point where it constitutes more of a regulatory speck than a meaningful market presence");
Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle
Safety, 4 YALE J. oN REG. 257, 264 (1987) (noting agency has ceased issuing new safety standards
and "relaxed, rescinded, or shelved a number of existing and proposed safety standards").
137. As one observer has noted, "The enormous discrepancy between tort liability and statu-
tory fines has been demonstrated repeatedly." Schwartz, supra, note 19, at n.68; see, e.g., the
discussion of the MER/29 case, supra note 29. Similarly, another drug company was fined
$25,000 for a similar violation under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act; a later tort suit involving
the defect cost the company $6 million. See Howard M. Metzenbaum, Is Government Protecting
Consumers?, TLAL, Apr. 1986, at 22, 26. Another company was fined the largest amount ever
levied for a violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act for deceiving the FDA-the amount of
which, some two million dollars, is obviously relatively small by products liability damages stan-
dards. Martin Mintz, Careers, Trust at Stake in Beech-Nut Trial, WASH. Post, Nov. 29, 1987, at
H2.
138. Exee. Order No. 12,291 3 C.F.R. 128 (1981), states:
Sec. 2. General Requirements. In promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing
regulations, and developing legislative proposals concerning regulation, all agencies, to
the extent permitted by law, shall adhere to the following requirements:
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to soci-
ety for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society.
See also Exe. Order No. 12,498 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985).
139. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
140. Courts typically determine that a product is unreasonably dangerous by a risk-utility bal-
ancing test, a test which is satisfied if a reasonable person would conclude that the danger out-
weighs the benefits of the product's design. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1087 (5th Cir. 1973) (stating that product is unreasonably dangerous if, on balance,
utility of product does not outweigh magnitude of danger), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974);
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978) (weighing product utility
against danger, in this balancing process, the court must consider whether risk could have been
reduced without siguificant impact on product effectiveness and manufacturing cost); Knitz v.
Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio) (listing as factors to consider in risk utility test
the likelihood of injury, gravity of danger, and mechanical and economic feasibility of improved
design), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847
(Tex. 1979) (considering the "utility of the product and the risks involved in its use").
Dean Keeton has formulated the risk-utility test this way: "A product.., is unreasonably
dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically perceiv-
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other words, federal agencies may impose a requirement when benefits out-
weigh costs, while (in principle) courts must find liability when benefits
outweigh costs. As a result, in the typical case, tort law makes greater for-
mal demands, backed by incentives more likely to compel compliance, than
does regulation itself. 4 '
Regulatory or statutory standards normally define only minimum prod-
uct design or warning standards. Although a court may regard compliance
with regulatory or statutory standards as evidence of the adequacy of a
product design or warning label, such compliance is not conclusive. 42 On
the contrary, courts normally find compliance to indicate only that the man-
ufacturer has undertaken the minimum effort required to comply with the
statute,143 not necessarily the effort needed to ensure that a product design
creates no "unreasonably dangerous"'" conditions that may injure a con-
sumer. 4 5 Even when a regulatory rule clearly applies to the defendant's
able danger... outweighed the benefits of the way the product was so designed and marketed."
W. Page Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 37-38
(1973). This standard is essentially identical to the cost-benefit test applied in negligence law.
See WLLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS Or TORT LAW 64 (1987).
141. State tort law routinely places more stringent demands on manufacturers than do the
related federal requirements. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446 (10th Cir.
1976) ("Compliance with [federal] governmental air-safety regulations is admissible, but not con-
clusive, evidence in a suit arising out of a plane crash."); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 468
F. Supp. 593, 606 (E.D. N.Y. 1979) (finding manufacturer liable for injury caused by defective
design of door locks), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 647 F.2d 241, 252 (2d Cir.
1981); Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 646 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Idaho 1982) (requiring manufac-
turer of alleged defective seat belt and steering column to apportion plaintiff's injuries). Compli-
ance with federal safety standards generally does not constitute a defense to a products liability
action, though failure to comply with federal design standards almost certainly would give rise to
liability. The proposition applies generally in all areas of products liability. See, e.g., Bruce, 544
F.2d at 446 (Maryland law); Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975)
(North Carolina law); Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1973)
(New Hampshire law).
142. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Olsen v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 59, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1981); MacDonald v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 375 N.E.2d 65, 69-70 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985);
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328, reh'g denied, 579 P.2d 1287, 1288 (Or.
1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C, at 39-40 (1965); Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Perez,
591 S.W.2d 907, 914-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
143. Noncompliance with federal product safety standards has for that reason frequently been
the basis, not only for tort liability, but also for the imposition of punitive damages in products
liability cases. See Rustad, supra note 32, at 69.
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(I) (1965). The Restatement provides that
"[olne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property." Id.
145. Comment (a) to § 288C of the Restatement clearly treats statutory standards as represent-
ing only the minimum acceptable level of care. It provides that, absent circumstances which call
for further precautions, "the minimum standard prescribed by the legislation or regulation may be
accepted by the triers of fact, or by the court as a matter of law, as sufficient for the occasion."
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behavior in a product safety suit,1 46 in most circumstances the standard of
behavior demanded by tort law at least equals that demanded by the regula-
tory rule, and in many cases, tort law exceeds the regulatory standard. 147
Furthermore, although violations of statutory or regulatory standards
might, contrary to the general rule, be found not to constitute negligence as
a matter of law, a trier of fact might nevertheless find that the violation
amounts to negligence. 148 A court could find that the regulatory rule does
not cover the "special risks" presented by the product involved in litiga-
tion. 14 9 Or a court could find that the statute has become obsolete and
therefore is inadequate as a standard of care.'5 ' As one observer has noted,
in such circumstances "the agency's regulation does not address the under-
lying conduct that is at the heart of the tort claim."'' For that reason, the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965). Dean Prosser has stated that statutory
standards of behavior should be regarded as acceptable for purposes of tort liability only in "nor-
mal situation[s], clearly identical with . . . [t]hose contemplated by the statute or regulation."
WinLiAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 210 (4th ed. 1971). Professor Morris
has argued that the "optimum conditions are seldom present in accident cases." Morris, supra
note 122, at 47.
146. The Restatement requires that before a statutory standard is adopted as a minimum stan-
dard of care, two conditions are fulfilled: first, the person seeking protection under the standard
must fall within the class of persons the legislature intended to protect; and second, the injury
must be of the type the legislature intended to prevent. See REsTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 286 (1965).
147. There are some cases in which statutory requirements exceed the standard of care. The
Restatement permits statutory violations to be excused in a tort context under some circumstances,
including incapacity, inability, or emergency, and the courts have sometimes ignored statutory
requirements in such circumstances. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A; see, e.g., Zeni v.
Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Mich. 1976).
However, certain types of statutes, including those most germane here, are commonly inter-
preted not to allow for an excuse to commit a tort. These include child labor laws, pure food and
drug acts, product safety statutes, and workplace safety statutes. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER Er AL.,
TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 246 (7th ed. 1987).
148. See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) oFToRTS § 288C, cmt. a (1965). The Restatement provides:
Where there are no... special circumstances, the minimum standard prescribed by the
legislation or regulation may be accepted by the triers of fact, or by the court as a matter
of law, as sufficient for the occasion; but if for any reason a reasonable man would take
additional precautions, the provision does not preclude a finding that the actor should do
SO.
Id.
149. See, e.g., Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. 1976). In Burch, the
court found that the Federal Hazardous Substances Act mandated that general warnings be pro-
vided to users of over 300,000 products, many of which presented special dangers requiring "more
detailed and specific instructions than the general warnings prescribed by the Act." Id. at 1085;
see also O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 817, 819 (D. Kan. 1985) (finding
FDA-approved warning need not be adequate when defendant's tampon posed greater risk of toxic
shock syndrome than other tampons), modified, 821 F.2d 1438, 1449 (10th Cir. 1987).
150. See, e.g., Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1027 (1st Cir. 1973) (noting
that flammability standards had remained unchanged for over a decade, allowing highly flamma-
ble textiles to remain on the market).
151. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1144.
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court may choose not to apply a regulatory rule as the standard of care,
although the rule clearly controls the very aspect of product performance at
issue. If so, tort standards will again exceed the regulatory requirement,
even though the two are formally identical. In many instances federal regu-
latory standards are expressly designed to serve only as a minimal require-
ment; the statutes explicitly allow state tort actions to proceed when claims
rest on an asserted higher standard of care than that mandated by the statute.
For example, courts have imposed liability on automobile manufactur-
ers for numerous design characteristics, although the manufacturer had fully
complied with the applicable NHTSA requirements germane to the alleged
cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.152 The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act153 provides: "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety
standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any
liability under common law." 154 Courts have interpreted this provision as
allowing a tort action to proceed even when it would result in a state stan-
dard that exceeds the federal standard. Indeed, Congress explicitly contem-
152. See, e.g., Sheckells v. AGV-USA Corp., 987 F.2d 1532, 1533 (11th Cir. 1993) (imposing
liability in FMVSS 218, motorcycle helmet case); Perry v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 957 F.2d
1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1992) (imposing liability in FMVSS 208, occupant crash protection case);
Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 212 (3d Cir. 1991) (imposing liability in FMVSS
202, head restraints case); Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 333 (4th Cir.) (finding
compliance with FMVSS 218 requirements for motorcycle helmet was not a defense to product
liability action premised on performance of helmet), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 79 (1991); Sours v.
General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir. 1983) (imposing liability in FMVSS 216,
roof crush resistance case); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1982) (find-
ing compliance with FMVSS's 207, 209, and 210 did not preclude liability or punitive damages
when inadequate performance of affected automobile characteristics contributed to injury); Seese
v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1981) (FMVSS 212, windshield mounting);
Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1980) (FMVSS 215, exterior protection); Fox v.
Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (FMVSSs 208 and 210, seatbelts and seatbelt
anchors); Hurt v. General Motors Corp., 553 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1977) (FMVSS 209, seatbelt
assemblies); Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976); Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (injury due to displacement of steering column, later the
subject of FMVSS 204); Swope v. STI Transit Co., 796 F. Supp. 160, 165 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (find-
ing compliance with FMVSS 108 requirements for illumination was not a defense to products
liability action, but defendant's summary judgment motion granted because defendant manufac-
turer had no duty to warn trailer user of inadequate illumination); Dancer v. Dorsey Trailer, Inc.,
1992 WL 76981, *1-2 (E.D.Pa. 1992) (finding compliance with FMVSS 108 requirements for
illumination was not a defense to products liability action premised on inability to see trailer at
night); Welsh v. Century Products Inc., 745 F. Supp. 313 (D. Md. 1990) (FMVSS 213, child
seating systems); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981) (FMVSS 301, fuel system integrity); Maccuish v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 22 Mass.
App. Ct. 380,494 N.E.2d 390 (1986) (FMVSS 217, bus window retention and release); Werthman
v. General Motors Corp., 187 Mich. App. 238, 466 N.W.2d 305 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (FMVSS
205, glazing materials); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Vyo. 1978) (FMVSS 207,
seating systems).
153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988 & Supp. mI 1991).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988 & Supp. III. 1991).
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plated that the federal safety standards would state only minimum standards
and that manufacturers could be held to higher standards under state tort
law. 155
Such cases are common. For example, in Welsh v. Century Products,
Inc.,'5 6 a child was injured in an automobile accident while seated in a child
car seat that both sides agreed15 7 complied fully with FMVSS 213, which
"specifies requirements for child restraint systems used in motor vehi-
cles."' 58 The parents claimed that the injuries were caused by defects in the
design of the seat. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment on the
basis that the claim was preempted under the Safety Act by § 1392(d). Re-
lying on the "savings clause,"' 5 9 the court ruled that the claim was not pre-
empted, even though the plaintiffs' claims concerned the "same aspect of
performance" as the applicable federal safety standard.16 0 Thus, when the
plaintiffs' claims succeeded, the standard applied by the jury necessarily
exceeded the federal standard, because the feddral standard was already
satisfied.' 61
155. The Senate Report on the bill stated that "the Federal minimum safety standards need not
be interpreted as restricting state common law standards of care. Compliance with such Standards
would thus not necessarily shield any person from product liability at common law." S. REP. No.
1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2709, 2720. The House Report
stated that "this subsection specifically establishes that compliance with safety standards is not to
be a defense or otherwise to affect the rights of parties under common law particularly those
related to... tort liability." H.R. RP. No. 1.776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1966). Accordingly, 15
U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) provides in part:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is
in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to
establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor
vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of
such vehicle or item of equipment which is identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in
this section shall be construed as preventing any State from enforcing any safety stan-
dard which is not identical to a Federal safety standard.
Id.
156. 745 F. Supp. 313 (D. Md. 1990).
157. Id. at 315.
158. Id. (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 571.213.Sl (1992)).
159. See supra note 47.
160. Welsh, 745 F. Supp. at 316-18.
161. Although a few courts have held that § 1392(d) expressly preempts state tort actions, see,
e.g., Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761, 763 (D. Md. 1986) (granting motion for sum-
mary judgment on the basis of preemption), the far more widely accepted view is that preemption
does not occur (except in the airbag context, in which preemption is normally considered implied
and not express), and that state tort actions applying more stringent standards than the applicable
FMVSS may go forward, see, e.g., Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F. Supp. 407, 410-11 (D. Md.
1987) (distinguishing Cox).
This has been the view since Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968),
in which the Eighth Circuit held that the Safety Act was intended to be an addition to the common
law of negligence and product liability and not a replacement for it, and that it therefore did not
prevent plaintiff from pursuing his claims. The court in Larsen stated:
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Further evidence of a coincidence of concerns between tort and regula-
tion is implicit in defendants' claims that federal regulation preempts state
tort liability. Preemption claims are necessarily founded on an assertion of
compliance with federal standards, because noncompliance would render
the preemption claim moot.'62 Many crashworthiness cases, therefore, in-
volve full compliance with all NHTSA standards, and implicitly contain an
assertion that state standards impose more stringent demands.
The situation in the pharmaceutical industry is much the same, despite
the unusually comprehensive nature of pharmaceutical regulation. The
FDA demands extensive testing of every pharmaceutical product that
reaches the market, 163 approves consumer and physician warning labels,"64
and conducts extensive post-marketing surveillance. 165 Nevertheless, tort
law routinely imposes higher standards on manufacturers than does the
FDA. Pharmaceuticals, like other products, are subject to strict liability in
tort based on manufacturing defects and, depending on the jurisdiction, may
be subject to strict liability based on design defect or failure to warn.' 66
Juries have been allowed to determine, independently of the FDA's evalua-
tion, whether a pharmaceutical product contains design defects and there-
fore is unreasonably dangerous per se, and have found products previously
We perceive of no sound reason, either in logic or experience, nor any command or
precedent, why the manufacturer should not be held to a reasonable duty of care in the
design of its vehicle consonant with the state of the art to minimize the effect of acci-
dents. The manufacturers are not insurers, but should be held to a standard of reason-
able care in design to provide a reasonably safe vehicle in which to travel....
.... The common law standard of duty to use reasonable care in light of all the
circumstances can at least serve the needs of our society until the legislature imposes
higher standards or the courts expand the doctrine of strict liability for tort. The Act is a
salutary step in this direction and not an exemption from common law liability.
Id. at 503, 506; see also Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 958 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that
compliance with federal safety standards is not incompatible with manufacturers' liability for
injuries to the consumer), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) provides in part: "Nothing in this section shall be construed
as preventing any State from enforcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety
standard."
163. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1988) (requiring approval of Investigational New Drug applica-
tion); 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1988) (requiring "'substantial evidence' . . . consisting of adequate and
well-controlled investigations" for approval of New Drug Application); David A. Kessler, The
Regulation of Investigational Drugs, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 281 (1989) (discussing the regulatory
process of pre-market FDA screening). The Food and Drug Administration's statutory responsi-
bilities are defined at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
164. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F) (1988).
165. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1985); see also FooD AND DRUG ADMtNISmATrION, D~M rr GumE-
LINE FOR POSTMARKETING REPORT OF ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS, Docket No. 85D-0249 (Aug.
23, 1985).
166. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 380 (N.J. 1984) ("[We are of the
opinion that generally the principle of strict liability is applicable to manufacturers of prescription
drugs.").
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approved by the FDA to be unsafe.167 Similarly, juries have found pharma-
ceutical manufacturers' warnings inadequate, even when the FDA man-
dated the warning in question. 6 s Compliance with FDA regulatory
requirements thus does not provide protection against product liability
claims. 169
The same appears to be true in many other areas in which federal
health and safety regulation exists: tort standards often exceed those for-
mally enunciated by federal regulators. For example, John Morrall offers a
list of federal health and safety regulations for which "cost" has been calcu-
lated.' 70 The standards of almost all listed regulations have been exceeded
in products liability cases. Although not every state or federal judicial cir-
167. See, e.g., Abbott v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1115-16 (4th Cir.) (remand-
ing for a jury determination of a design defect claim), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 260 (1988); Hurley
v. Lederle Labs., 851 F.2d 1536, 1542 (5th Cir. 1988) (same), modifled, 863 F.2d 1173 (1989);
Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654-57 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that manu-
facturer could be liable for design defect in the drug and for failure to warn physicians of risks
associated with the drug); Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 295 (N.D. Ga.)
(including factfinder's holding that pharmaceutical caused birth defect despite FDA finding to the
contrary), modified, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
The Restatement of Torts has taken the view that prescription drugs should be excluded from
liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965):
[S]ome products ... are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs.... The seller of such
products... is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending
their use .... Opinions differ as to the extent to which the Restatement's position has
reduced the litigation of design defect cases.
Id. Compare Note, supra note 111, at 777-78 ("Although the Restatement ... suggests that
prescription drugs should be excluded from strict liability, pharmaceuticals are commonly subject
to strict liability." (footnotes omitted)) with Judith P. Swazey, Prescription Drug Safety and Prod-
uct Liability, in THE LLAsn.rry MAZE: THE IMPACr OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVA-
TMON 291-305 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) ("But to date there have been
relatively few [design defect cases for prescription drugs], given the Comment k view that these
are unavoidably unsafe products .... ).
168. See, e.g., Brochu, 642 F.2d at 658 (holding that although warnings were drafted by the
FDA, they were inadequate); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 534 (Or.
1974) (finding manufacturer liable for inadequate warning though FDA wrote the warning); see
also Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 (Kan.) (finding warning
inadequate because of failure to disclose a danger, though FDA had ruled out inclusion of the
danger on the warning label because of inadequate scientific evidence for it), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 965 (1984); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 378-79 (N.J. 1984). See generally
Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State Tort Law
Drug Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. LJ., 171, 185-88 (1986) (discussing conflict between
FDA regulation and state law regarding the content of warning labels).
169. Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that compli-
ance with federal regulations will not immunize manufacturers from state product liability com-
mon law); Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1491 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding that
compliance with FDA regulations did not preclude liability for dangerous product); MacDonald v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass. 1985) (holding that compliance with
FDA requirements is not conclusive of negligence issue), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
170. Morrall, supra note 108, at 25.
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cuit has addressed the precise factual situation contemplated by each regu-
lation, the advantages of nationwide product distribution and the existence
of economies of scale in production often force national compliance with a
standard imposed on a less-than-national basis.
Regulatory standards have, at times, explicitly adopted the criteria of
tort law. For example, the Consumer Product Safety Act authorizes the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to recall products that pose
a "substantial risk of injury to the public" '171 either because they violate an
agency rule or because they contain a "defect." Interpreting the word "de-
fect," the CPSC directly imported the parameters of the "defect" concept of
modem products liability law, including the concepts of manufacturing mis-
take, improper design, and inadequate warning,' 72 into its regulatory stan-
dard.'73 The incremental impact of regulation in such cases is clearly
minimal.
2. Incentives to Comply with the Rules
The mere announcement of standards by courts does not by itself en-
sure compliance. However, incentives to comply with tort requirements
have risen significantly since the middle 1970s, while the enforcement of
federal regulation has declined. The amount of litigation has increased, and
the monetary consequences of liability also appear to have escalated. As
the vitality of the tort reform movement demonstrates, 74 tort liability has
become a predominant concern of potential defendants. Regulation may
thus largely be superseded in actual impact as well as in formal mandate.
At the same time, other trends have lessened the impact of regulation.'1
7
Easing health and safety regulation is likely to have less impact on the be-
havior of an industry than the literature has generally suggested, while ad-
171. 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (1988).
172. Despite efforts to expand the reach of the interpretive rule beyond common-law concepts
of product liability, the agency has largely retreated from those efforts. The agency recently
expanded the list of examples to include concepts not within the parameters of product liability
law, but withdrew them in response to industry complaints. See Adler, supra note 119, at 118-19.
173. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1988):
A defect, for example, may be the result of a manufacturing or production error.... In
addition, the design of and the materials used in a consumer product may also result in a
defct .... With respect to instruction, a consumer product may contain a defect if the
instructions for assembly or use could allow the product, otherwise safely designed and
manufactured, to present a risk of injury .... However, not all products which present a
risk of injury are defective... [The product] does not contain a defect... [when] the
risk of injury is outweighed by the usefulness of the product which is made possible by
the same aspect which presents the risk of injury.
Id.
174. See supra note 5.
175. See supra Part H.
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ding additional regulation might well have little impact on private behavior
or costs.
17 6
a. Products Liability Case Filings
Product manufacturers are increasingly susceptible to product liability
claims. The pattern of overall tort filings recently has been the subject of
controversy, with some commentators suggesting that we are in the midst of
a "litigation explosion 1 77 and others questioning the data on which that
conclusion is based.1 78 In both state 179 and federal courts, 8 ' total caseloads
appear to have increased. On the other hand, critics of the "litigation explo-
sion" view question whether this increase in filing rates in federal court
suggests that anything has gone seriously wrong with the litigation system.
For example, Michael Saks notes that tort filings grew less quickly over the
1975-1985 period than did non-tort cases; that the growth rate in filings
over that period is exaggerated by the choice of a year with an unusually
low level of claims as the starting point for the comparisons; that one-third
of all product liability cases in the mid-1980s were asbestos-related and
thus grew out of relatively unusual circumstances; and that the only clear
growth in tort filings occurred in the federal courts, where only two percent
of cases are filed.181 In state courts, the rate of tort filings is harder to
calculate because of state-to-state variation in the quality of record keeping
and in definitions of categories. Although there is considerable variation
among states, Saks notes that in the aggregate "state tort cases grew at a
modest annual rate of somewhere between 2.3% and 3.9%. Adjusting for
population growth, the figure does not rise above 3%.''182
However, these figures describe the behavior of the tort system as a
whole and are not relevant to product safety issues. The Rand Corpora-
tion's Institute for Civil Justice (RAND) suggests that the aggregate tort
data just described are a composite of the results of three separate "worlds,"
each of which behaves differently from the others.183 The first "consists of
routine personal injury suits, mostly automobile cases with modest stakes
and settled law." ' 4 This class of cases, which because of its relative size
176. See infra Part IV.
177. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LaiAATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 1 (1991).
178. Andrew Blum, Debate Still Rages on Torts, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 16, 1992, at 1, 1.
179. See Henry J. Reske, Record State Caseloads in 1990,78 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 23, 23.
180. The tort portion of the federal courts' caseload increased 62% from 1975 to 1985, from
25,691 to 41,593 cases. Saks, supra note 1, at 1201.
181. Id. at 1198-1200.
182. Id. at 1207.
183. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE
STATISTICS 2-3 (1987).
184. Id; see, e.g., Saks, supra note 1, at 1209.
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dominates the data for torts cases as a whole, "show[s] a slight increase,
which roughly mirrors population growth during this period; in other words,
litigation in this area remained basically stable."' 5 The second world of
torts cases "consists of high stakes cases, notably products liability, medical
malpractice, and business torts. Here the litigation itself is newer, the law is
still evolving, and the stakes per case are larger and increasingly uncer-
tain."'8 6 The limited available data seem to indicate rapid growth in the
number of such case filings.' 8 7 Finally, there is "the world of mass latent
injury cases, such as asbestos litigation, Dalkon Shield cases, and other
suits arising from mass exposure to drugs, chemicals, or other toxic sub-
stances." This class of cases demonstrates "truly explosive growth," and
a rapidly rising burden for defendants. The increase in the latter two cate-
gories of cases suggests that potential defendants in products liability cases
have an increased incentive to behave in a manner designed to reduce the
risk of liability.'8 9
b. Damage Awards
The amount of money awarded in products liability cases has also in-
creased since the mid-1970s. The possibility of higher damage awards also
suggests that potential defendants have an increased incentive to comply
with the behavioral standards of products liability law. Again, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between aggregate tort awards and awards in the more
narrowly defined field of products liability and mass exposure torts. Ac-
cording to the RAND studies, median jury awards in tort cases as a whole
were quite stable between 1980 and 1987, but the median jury award in
products liability and medical malpractice rose "very sharply."' 190 This up-
ward trend apparently persists even if the awards data are adjusted for infla-
185. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 183, at 7 (citing DEBORAH R. HENSLER, TRENDS IN CALIFOR-
NIA TORT LiABILrrY LMGATION (RAND Institute for Civil Justice No. P-7287-ICJ, 1987)).
186. Id. at 3.
187. Id. at 8.
188. Id. at 3.
189. In an environment in which total injuries are declining, a rising volume of cases means a
higher probability of a potential defendant facing suit. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES 121, tbls. 184 & 185 (112th ed. 1992). One would expect this
to produce more behavior designed to reduce the risk of causing injury and thus the risk of
liability.
A rising ratio of suits to injuries, however, will not necessarily have that effect. For example,
automobile manufacturers might increase their safety expenditures per car only if the number of
suits per car sold, or the ratio of damage awards to revenue, were to rise. However, the ratio of
suits to injuries might rise while these indicators of the degree of incentive fall, if the number of
injuries fall sufficiently. Furthermore, their behavior will be affected by their perception of
whether suits are coming from the pool of injuries arguably caused by some defect or from the
pool of injuries caused by other sources such as operator error.
190. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 183, at 16.
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tion using not the Consumer Price Index, but, as Saks urges, 9 ' a medical
cost deflator that better reflects the inflation of actual components of tort
awards. 1
92
As RAND points out,193 the expected jury award-which more di-
rectly affects the behavior of potential defendants than the average award-
has risen, not just because the average award is higher, but because the
probability of plaintiff victory also has risen. Average or median awards
reflect only the cases actually litigated to judgment and do not adjust for the
number of claims made for which no damage award resulted. The expected
award per suit brought-and hence the incentive to the plaintiff to bring
suit and the incentive to the potential defendant to modify behavior in the
hopes of avoiding liability-has risen more sharply than actual awards be-
cause the plaintiff's probability of victory has also risen between the 1960s
and the 1980s. As RAND points out,
For every type of liability case, Cook County plaintiffs were far
more successful in the early 1980's than were plaintiffs twenty
years earlier. For example, in the 1960's, plaintiffs won about
one-fourth of product liability and malpractice cases. In the late
1970's, they won about one-third of such cases. By the 1980's,
they were winning almost one-half of them.
The increased probability of winning, coupled with the in-
crease in average awards, results in higher expected awards ....
The expected award for auto cases has risen from about $25,000
to $60,000-$90,000 at the end of the period, but this move is
dwarfed by the rocketing awards in product liability cases, which
grew 400-900 percent between 1960 and 1984.114
Product manufacturers' decisions about product designs, manufactur-
ing monitoring, or safety warning labels are likely to be based on antici-
pated awards and not past awards. Since both observed awards and
probability of plaintiff victory have been rising, the deterrent effect and
hence the regulatory value of tort law (and product liability in particular)
has also been rising.'95
191. Saks, supra note I, at 1246-47.
192. MARK A. PETERSON, COMPENSATION OF INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN COOK
COUNTY 49-50 (1984). Because tort awards reflect other variables besides medical costs (such as
plaintiff's earnings and pain and suffering), adjustments using a medical cost deflator, which Saks
suggests, probably overstate the appropriate inflation adjustment.
193. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 183, at 13, 18-19.
194. Id. at 18-19.
195. Discussion of the deterrent effect of tort law depends on an assumption that the system is
perceived to be rational in selecting winning cases. In fact, perceptions about the tort system
appear considerably to outrun its actual effect. As Saks explains:
mhe data strongly suggest that our tort system hits infrequently and lightly. Yet, it has
nevertheless somehow succeeded in frightening a great many potential defendants, who
seem to go to considerable lengths to avoid becoming actual defendants. Somehow
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III. EMPIRIcAL STUDIES OF THE COST OF REGULATION
Despite the obvious relevance of the tort system to the evaluation of
the costs and benefits of health, safety, and environmental regulation, virtu-
ally none of the empirical work evaluating such regulation has considered
the dramatic changes in the tort system that occurred simultaneously with
the imposition of modem social regulation. Instead, by default, researchers
have conflated the costs and benefits of regulation with those of the new
tort doctrines. As a result, the measured costs and benefits of regulation
and the anticipated benefits from deregulation were overstated to include
the costs actually associated with tort law. For two decades, federal regula-
tory policy has been distorted by what econometricians call an omitted vari-
ables problem.' 96
The effects of this miscalculation are serious. It means that we have
little understanding of the relative costs and benefits of alternative ap-
proaches to ensuring product safety. Modem products liability law, for ex-
ample, has been regarded by some197 as generating minimal benefits in the
form of safer products.' 98 The regulatory studies leave open the possibility
that tort law may have had an unacknowledged impact in improving prod-
uct safety. 199
The difficulty results from the powerful coincidence in time between
the development of products liability law and much of the modem regula-
tory regime. Modem products liability doctrine, as a matter of recognized
law, could be said to have begun with Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.2" It developed with increasing momentum after Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products2°' and the publication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
in 1964, and began to reach its full development only after Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp.2 Although some federal health and safety regulation existed
people have come to overestimate vastly the tort system's vigilance and the magnitude
of its sanctions.... The tort system is a mouse with an otherworldly roar.
Saks, supra note 1, at 1286-87 (citations omitted).
196. See DAVi) W. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANTrrATvE EvI-
DENCE 389-91 (1983).
197. See GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RE-
SPONSES TO PRODUCT LTABLrrY AND REGULATION 99-101 (RAND Institute for Civil Justice No.
3022-ICJ, 1983) (noting that products liability law has little benefit because lower-level corporate
managers are unable to perceive or respond to tort incentives).
198. See, e.g., Swazey, supra note 167, at 291, 293 (noting marginal effect of liability laws
and legislation on safety when compared with federal regulation).
199. Empirical studies of the impact of tort and products liability law on product safety gener-
ally remain inconclusive. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
200. 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960).
201. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
202. 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972). For a discussion of the past-Greenman development of prod-
ucts liability law, see FRANK VAuDALL, STRIcr LIABiLrrY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 9
(1989).
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prior to the 1960s, the modem revolution in health and safety regulation
essentially began in 1966 with the passage of the National Traffic and Mo-
tor Safety Act.2°0 The bulk of federal health and safety regulation was also
enacted during the few years surrounding 1970. As noted by one commen-
tator, "Of 47 federal consumer protection laws enacted between 1891 and
1972, fewer than half, or 21 statutes, were enacted in the first 75 years; the
remaining 26 were enacted in the years from 1966-1972. "20 This powerful
coincidence between products liability law and social regulation is nowhere
more clearly shown than in the area of automobile safety regulation.
A. A Brief History of Automobile Safety Mandates
Regulatory and common-law efforts to improve automobile safety de-
veloped essentially simultaneously in the early 1970s. Virtually all of the
development of the crashworthiness doctrine, for example, occurred during
this period. No requirement to design an automobile to protect the safety of
occupants from the so-called "second collision" existed prior to the decision
in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.2"5 So long as its products contained no
defects of materials or workmanship that themselves caused the accident,20 6
manufacturers had no duty to ensure the safety of their products.20 7
Thus, at the time the initial FMVSSs were issued in 1967,208 tort law
imposed no requirement on automobile manufacturers to design their prod-
ucts in a manner that reduced the chance of injury to passengers in the event
of an accident. For example, in Evans v. General Motors Corp.,209 decided
the same year that Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act,210 the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff who had alleged that
a car was not crashworthy had failed to state a claim because the manufac-
turer had no duty to design its cars so as to protect their occupants in the
event of an accident. According to the court, the manufacturer's duties
were limited to ensuring that its products contained no latent defects that
could cause the accident itself. 21   As one federal court recently noted,
"[A]s of 1966, no plaintiff had yet prevailed on a claim that an automobile
203. See Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
204. Adler, supra note 119, at 61 n.8; see also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS RE.
FORM 1 (1982) (describing the growth of federal regulation beginning in the mid-1960s).
205. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
206. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 79-80 (N.J. 1960).
207. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824-25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
836 (1966), overruled by Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
208. Huff, 565 F.2d at 110.
209. Id. at 110 app. A.
210. See 23 C.F.R. § 255 (1992).
211. 359 F.2d 822, 824-25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), overruled by Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
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was defectively designed." '12 The initial federal regulatory requirements
were imposed in an area essentially untouched by tort law. For example,
until the promulgation of FMVSS 208, which required manufacturers to
install lap and shoulder belts in all new vehicles,213 automakers had never
been required by the tort system to meet this type of design standard.21 4
Yet acceptance of the doctrine that manufacturers had a duty in tort to en-
sure the reasonable safety of their products, when it came, quickly became
widespread. Between the 1968 Larsen decision and Huff v. White Motor
Corp.,"5 decided in 1977, some thirty jurisdictions recognized the
crashworthiness doctrine.21
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, created in
1966,217 was initially a highly activist agency that aimed to impose dramati-
cally new safety requirements on automobile manufacturers. Congress ap-
parently intended the Safety Act to advance the technology of automobile
safety; 218 thus, the agency imposed new and difficult requirements on
automakers through a policy described as "technology-forcing,"2 9 to re-
quire manufacturers to invent and adopt automobile safety technology that
was nonexistent or not widely used at the time the regulation was im-
posed.220 Although some have questioned the agency's success in forcing
212. The Safety Act was enacted in 1966.
213. Evans, 359 F.2d at 824-25.
214. Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 405 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1065 (1990).
215. See 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415-16 (1967) (codified as amended at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208
(1984)). The initial standard requiring simple lap belts has evolved considerably over the years,
initially staying well ahead of existing industry standards.
In 1970, the agency revised Standard 208 to include passive protection requirements, 35
Fed. Reg. 16,927 (Nov. 3, 1970), and in 1972, the agency amended the Standard to
require full passive protection for all front seat occupants of vehicles manufactured after
August 15, 1975. 37 Fed. Reg. 3911 (Feb. 24, 1972). In the interim, vehicles built
between August 1973 and August 1975 were to carry either passive restraints or lap and
shoulder belts coupled with an "ignition interlock" that would prevent starting the vehi-
cle if the belts were not connected.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 35 (1983). Today's version
of Standard 208-still gradually being phased in-is essentially unchanged from the initial pas-
sive-restraint standard first introduced in 1972. See 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962 (1984) (allowing phase-
in of passive restraint requirements for all newly manufactured automobiles); 52 Fed. Reg. 10,096
(1987) (extending time period for full implementation of passive restraint requirement through
1993).
216. Several states enacted legislation in the early 1960s requiring that cars be equipped with
lap belts. Joan Claybrook & David Bollier, The Hidden Benefits of Regulation: Disclosing the
Auto Safety Payoff, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 87, 101 (1985).
217. Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
218. See infra note 220.
219. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 136, at 259 (citing P. LORANG & L. LINDEN, AUTOMO-
BILE SAFETY REGULATION: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE REGULATORY PROCESS 149-54
(1977)).
220. Claybrook & Bollier, supra note 216, at 100; Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 136, at 259.
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the development of new technology, 221 much technology mandated by
NHTSA in its first decade, not widely employed in 1966, has become com-
monplace-such as laminated windshields, collapsible steering assemblies,
enhanced door locks, interior padding, seat anchorages, and three-point
seatbelts. 222
As a result, NHTSA's impact occurred early in the agency's history, in
the very same period that the crashworthiness doctrine became generally
accepted in state courts. Since 1976 NHTSA essentially has ceased to en-
gage in rulemaking, and instead has concentrated its efforts largely on the
enforcement of existing standards through recalls of motor vehicles with
defects related to safety performance. 2 1 By 1974, when NHTSA had
221. LORANG & LINDEN, supra note 219, at 64-65 (noting that safety technology is "remarka-
bly similar to what it was in 1968, the first year federal rules took effect"); OFICaE oF TECHNOL-
OGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION, IX-43 (1981) (stating that federal safety standards had only a "slight influence" on
automobile industry innovation); Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 136, at 259 (citing STAFF OF THE
NAT'L COMM'N ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FEDERAL CONSUMER SAFETY LEGISLATION 21 (1970)).
Some have asserted that the standards NHTSA established in its early rulemaking years
largely codified existing industry practice.
The first generation of standards took what was good current practice within the
industry at the time and made that the required level of performance. Thus the five
inches of rearward movement of the steering column of FMVSS 204, the door-latch
strength requirements of FMVSS 206, the glass specifications of FMVSS 205, the seat
strength requirements of FMVSS 207, and the rest, all were fixed relative to good cur-
rent practice of the 1960s and early 1970s.
The one exception to this process was the occupant protection standard, FMVSS
208.
The politics of rule-making appear to require short lead times, which inevitably
results in a standard of performance that is already attained by some manufacturers.
The conclusion that must be drawn from the rulemaking process is that regulation
does not lead to innovation.
Murray Mackay, Liability, Safety and Innovation in the Automotive Industry, in THE LIABILITY
MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 191,204-05 (Peter W. Huber
& Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
222. Claybrook & Bollier, supra note 216, at 98. NHTSA issued 19 FMVSSs shortly after its
establishment under the Safety Act. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2409-10 (1967) (codified as amended at
49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1992)).
223. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 136, at 263. Out of 50 general safety regulations adopted
under the Safety Act, all were adopted prior to 1976, and some 90% were adopted prior to 1974.
ld. Although the agency has continued to amend existing rules, Mashaw and Harfst have labeled
these post-1976 amendments "substantively trivial." Id. at 265. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
found in 1985 that approximately 90% of price increases attributable to NHTSA's safety rules
occurred between 1967 and 1976. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT ON QUALITY CHANGES
FOR 1986 MODEL PASSENGER YEAR (1985); see also Mackay, supra note 221, at 205 ("From 1974
to 1984, little of major significance changed in the field of vehicle safety regulations aside from
some upgrading of existing requirements.").
For some hint of the reasons rulemaking has ceased, see B.F. Goodrich Co. v. United States
Dep't of Transp., 541 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977).
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completed ninety percent of its major rulemaking activity,2 24 almost all
courts that had considered the issue had accepted the doctrine of
crashworthiness. 2 5
B. Measuring the Effects of Regulation
The historical period in which product liability law developed and
spread throughout the states make it exceptionally difficult to discern the
separate influence of regulation and the new tort doctrine. Yet the enor-
mous costs226 allegedly attributable to social regulation played a major role
in the effort to reduce social regulation during the 1980s.227 This influence
was clearly misplaced; because the statistical studies used to attack social
regulation failed to separate the independent effects of tort law and social
regulation, those studies clearly overstated the benefits that deregulation
alone could achieve.
Two statistical techniques were widely used in measuring the costs of
regulation. In the first, less sophisticated method, engineering estimates of
the "incremental cost" of the regulation were derived by comparing the
costs, for example, of building a new factory that met all environmental or
worker safety standards to the costs of building an otherwise identical fac-
tory that did not meet the regulatory standards. 228 As has been widely rec-
ognized,22 9 the direct cost approach depends on the specification of the so-
called "counterfactual," which calculates what the level of costs would be in
the absence of the regulation. None of these studies incorporates the possi-
bility that the safety improvements might actually have been adopted even
224. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 136.
225. By the time NHTSA completed the last of its significant rulemakings, all 30 jurisdictions
that had considered crashworthiness claims accepted the doctrine that manufacturers had an obli-
gation in tort to design products to protect passengers from a "second collision." See Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 565 F. 2d 104, 107; see also id. at 110 app. A & B.
226. See Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and
Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REO. 233, 240 (1991).
227. See MrLTON D. FRrDMAN & ROSE FRmMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 207 (1979):
Granted all this, may these costs not be justified by the advantage of keeping dan-
gerous drugs off the market.... The most careful empirical study of this question that
has been made, by Sam Peltzman, concludes that the evidence is unambiguous: that the
harm done has greatly outweighed the good.
Id. Peltzman's analysis of pharmaceutical regulation is discussed infra notes 243-53 and accom-
panying text.
228. For examples of this technique, see ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., COST OF GovEumrET
REGULATION STUDY FOR THE Busnmss ROUNDTABLE passim (1979); CRANDALL Er AL., supra
note 31, at 32-37; LrrAN & NoRDHAus, supra note 17, at 18-27; Kit D. Farber & Gary L. Rut-
ledge, Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditures, 1982-85, SURV. CURRENT Bus., May 1988,
at 22, 22.
229. See, e.g., Hahn & Hird, supra note 226, at 240.
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without the regulation in question because of the independent impact of tort
law.230
The second technique used to measure the cost of regulation involves
looking for changes in price or output that occurred coincident in time with
the regulation and using statistical methods (usually multiple regression
analysis) to correct for those changes that would have occurred absent the
regulation. Again, the results of this technique depend on the specification
of what would have happened without the regulation. Although in principle
these statistical methods account for all other factors affecting the industry,
none of the studies in question attempted to include, or even recognized the
relevance of, the massive contemporaneous changes in tort law.
One such statistical method involves a multiple regression analysis231
explaining industry output or prices over time; the analysis includes a
dummy variable232 for the year in which the regulation was imposed. For
example, the impact of a regulation on an industry's prices might be mea-
sured by a regression analysis that includes, among other things, a variable
that assumes a value of zero for observations prior to the date when the
regulation became effective and a value of one for observations after that
date. Statistical significance for that variable implies a measurable impact
of the regulation on the dependent variable such as industry output or price.
The other statistical method by which coincidences in time are taken
into account is quite similar. Using multiple regression analysis, the analyst
models the behavior of the industry in the years prior to the regulation, then
uses that model to predict the behavior of the industry in the years after the
regulation. Any difference between predicted and actual behavior can pre-
sumably be attributed to the regulation.
Both statistical methods rely on the ceteris paribus2 33 assumption that
all that is changing between the world pre-regulation and the world post-
regulation are the variables specifically included in the model itself. Such
an assumption is incorrect, however, when at the same time the explicitly
230. Hahn and Hird give the example of a change in consumer demand that would lead to the
adoption of the same measure compelled by the regulation. In principle, the cost of the safety
measure should not be included in the calculated cost of the regulation, because it would have
been adopted anyway; however, the expenditure/engineering studies do count the cost of that
safety measure, because the regulation compels it. Id. at 240.
231. Regression analysis is a method for examining the relationships among large num-
bers of variables.... [Riegression coefficients describe the relationships between each
of the independent variables, so-called because their values are independent of each
other, and the dependent variable, so-called because its value depends on the values of
the independent variables.
BAmsS, supra note 196, at 293.
232. For an explanation of dummy variables, see id. at 322.
233. Ceteris paribus is roughly translated as "all else being equal," and it is a central assump-
tion in most economic analysis. See BRowNrN & BROWNIN, supra note 20, at 489.
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included factors are changing, another force is reshaping the world upon
which the model operates. A measurement designed to gauge the impact of
regulation would in fact account for more than the regulation alone; it
would capture the combined effect of the regulation and the independent
force. 2
34
That is exactly the case here. Analysts studied the effects of federal
health and safety regulation extensively during the last two decades. How-
ever, virtually none of this work took into account, in its measurement
methodology, the fact that the tort system was changing in the background.
C. Mattress Safety Regulation
Consider, for example, the mattress industry. In 1973, CPSC promul-
gated a rule requiring safety modifications to ensure that mattresses would
not bum when exposed to lit cigarettes. 235 At the same time, mattress man-
ufacturers were confronting the changing standards of liability that would
have led them independently to be concerned about mattress flammabil-
ity.11 Indeed, it was estimated that at the time the regulation was imposed,
approximately eighty percent of the mattresses produced already satisfied
the safety requirements of the regulation.237
In a study of the cost of the mattress flammability standard, Peter Lin-
neman23 8 attempted to capture the effect on mattress price using a multiple
regression analysis. The study explained the price of mattresses over time
by using a variety of mattress quality indices and included as an independ-
ent explanatory variable a dummy variable set equal to zero for the years
1959 to 1973 (prior to the CPSC rule) and equal to one for the years 1974 to
1977.239 Because the dummy variable's coefficient was positive and statis-
234. See, e.g., BAINas, supra note 196, at 389.
Omission of relevant independent variables affects our estimates of the regression
coefficients only if the omitted variable is correlated with one of the included variables.
If we calculate the correlation between an omitted variable and the included variable,
and if we find a statistically significant relationship between changes in the size of one
and the size of the other, we know that the regression coefficient on the included varia-
ble is measuring not just the effect of the included variable but also some of the effect of
the omitted variable. But our purpose in estimating a regression coefficient is to indi-
cate the effect of the independent variable alone on the dependent variable. The exist-
ence of an omitted correlated variable means that the estimate includes the effect of both
variables, not just the included variable.
Id.
235. 16 C.F.R. § 1632 (1993).
236. See, e.g., Berry v. Peterson, 887 F.2d 635, 636 (5th Cir. 1989); Farmer v. City of New-
port, 748 S.W.2d 162, 163-64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
237. Peter Linneman, The Effects of Consumer Safety Standards: The 1973 Mattress Flam-
mability Standard, 23 J.L. & ECON. 461, 462 (1980).
238. Id. at 471-72.
239. Id.
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tically significant, Linneman inferred that the regulation increased mattress
prices and based his cost estimate for the regulation on the estimated size of
the price increase.24
Of course, from 1959 to 1977 tort law became much more activist, and
products liability law changed significantly. Linneman compared two trend
lines (one of which includes the beginning of that period but not its end)
with another (which includes only the very end of the period), unavoidably
capturing whatever effects on output that change in tort doctrine engen-
dered. Designating those effects "the increase in mattress prices attributa-
ble to the [CPSC] standard," '241 Linneman overstated the true impact of the
regulation. The low R-squareds and statistically insignificant F-values Lin-
neman's results achieved enhance the inference that he omitted an impor-
tant variable.242
D. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Regulation
Another example is Sam Peltzman's influential study24 3 of the 1962
amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which required pharma-
ceutical manufacturers to test new chemical entities (NCEs) for efficacy. 244
This was classic consumer-protection legislation designed to prevent con-
sumers from buying useless products; testing for safety had been required
long before the 1962 amendments.24 Peltzman's failure to take tort law
into account biased his estimates of the impact of this consumer protection
legislation.
Peltzman first developed a model to explain the rate of introduction of
new drugs using annual data over the period 1948 to 1962.246 He then used
the estimated parameters to predict the rate of new drug introductions for
the decade following the 1962 amendments.247 Finding that actual intro-
ductions after 1962 were lower than the predicted rate, he concluded that
"all of the observed difference between pre- and post-1962 New Chemical
Entity (NCE) flows can be attributed to the 1962 amendments."248 He
based his estimates of the forgone benefits from new drugs made unachiev-
240. Empirical work employing this methodology includes Sam Peltzman, The Health Effects
of Mandatory Prescriptions, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 207, 213-34 (1987); W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of
Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 1973-1983, 17 RAND J. EcON. 567, 569-73 (1986).
241. Linneman, supra note 237, at 471.
242. See BARNEs, supra note 196, at 355-61,390; Linneman, supra note 237, at 466,468,473.
243. Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug
Amendments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049, 1051 (1973).
244. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988 & Supp. 1111992).
245. Id. § 360d.
246. Peltzman, supra note 243, at 1054.
247. Id. at 1056.
248. Id. at 1055-57.
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able by the amendments, and thus the costs of the amendments, on this
measured decline in the introduction rate.249
Of course, the potential tort liability of drug manufacturers also rose
after 1962. Although drug efficacy may not give rise to tort liability, rising
manufacturer concern about liability for drug safety might also have con-
tributed to the decline of drug introductions. Thus, Peltzman's estimates of
the cost of efficacy testing may be conflated with the cost of safety testing
beyond that mandated by the FDA, which may also have slowed the rate of
drug introductions. Moreover, Peltzman did not attempt to estimate the
benefits derived from higher levels of safety testing. His cost estimates,
which appear to include the effects of both efficacy testing and safety test-
ing, should be compared both to his estimated efficacy benefits and to the
enhanced safety benefits that he did not estimate. In light of these short-
comings, Peltzman's view of the 1962 amendments may be unduly
negative.25°
The omission of a relevant variable from Peltzman's statistical work
appears less obvious on its face than is true of Linneman's work. In the
Linneman dummy-variable approach discussed above, one piece of evi-
dence that an important explanatory variable had been onfitted from Linne-
man's estimating equation was the low statistical significance of the
equation as a whole. In Peltzman's model, the same complaint cannot be
made; Peltzman's model estimates in the 1948-62 pre-regulation time pe-
riod were statistically highly significant.251 This suggests, however, one
difference between the Peltzman model-prediction methodology and the
Linneman dummy-variable methodology. Peltzman's estimates were de-
rived entirely on data prior to the regulation and prior to the development of
products liability doctrine. If, in fact, products liability concerns do affect
new drug introductions, that omitted variable should have had no impact
whatever on Peltzman's pre-1962 estimates. Peltzman's pre-1962 estimates
look quite strong but in fact were a weak basis for forecasting the post-1962
period because the omitted variable became significant only after 1962.
One piece of evidence suggesting that the omitted variable of products
liability law had an important impact on new drug introductions is that
Peltzman's forecasts for the post-1962 period increasingly overestimated
249. Empirical work employing a similar methodology includes Sam Peltzman, The Effects of
Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. EcoN. 677, 678-97 (1975).
250. There has been little effort to disentangle the effects of drug regulation from those of
product liability for drug manufacturers. There is a significant danger of double-counting costs,
with the same costs attributed to both federal drug regulation and tort liability. Compare
Peltzman, supra note 243, at 1052-58, 1089 with HUBER, supra note 13, at 155 (contending,
respectively, that decline in introduction of new drugs is due to the federal regulation or expansion
of tort liability).
251. Peltzman, supra note 243, at 1054.
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actual NCE introduction during the 1962-1972 period.252 Efficacy testing
was required of all NCEs beginning in 1962. Although the requirement
might not have had an immediate impact, the static requirement that drug
companies provide proof of efficacy for all NCEs after that date, and the
possibility of increasing skill in performing that testing suggest that the re-
quirement might have had its greatest impact quickly, and that the impact
may have diminished over time as companies acquired greater skill in per-
forming the tests. On the other hand, products liability law developed grad-
ually over the 1962-1971 period and was considerably more vibrant at the
end of that period than at the beginning. If safety testing reduced the rate of
NCE introductions, and if greater safety testing was performed in response
to growing concern about liability, then one would expect exactly what is
observed: that the rate of NCE introductions would decline over the 1962-
71 period and that the gap between predicted and actual introductions
would widen." 3
E. Automobiles Revisited
Peltzman's later analysis of the impact of automobile safety regulation
on fatalities' 4 also seems to ignore the role of torts. Empirical work testing
Peltzman's results tends to confirm this hypothesis.255 Peltzman designed a
statistical model to explain highway fatalities (both for automobile occu-
pants and for pedestrians and bicyclists) using data from the period 1947-
1965. He then used the model and values of his independent variables to
predict fatalities over the period 1966-1972.56 Actual fatalities of automo-
bile occupants in the post-1965 period do lie below the values predicted by
his model, though by less than the engineering estimates of the NHTSA
standards suggest, but Peltzman finds considerable "offsetting behavior"-
that is, that individuals drive less carefully given the enhanced safety fea-
tures of their cars, and thus fatalities among pedestrians and cyclists rise in
252. Id. at 1056. Although Peltzman does not provide actual numbers for his predicted new
chemical entities series, the pattern apparent in his chart strongly suggests that the gap between
predicted and actual NCEs grew over the post-regulation period. See id.
253. Recent tort reform literature strongly suggests the possibility that greater products liabil-
ity risk has slowed the rate of new pharmaceutical development. See, e.g., Louis Lasagna, The
Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug Development, in THE LABurrY MAZE: THE
IMpAcr oF LLx nrry LAW ON SAFEry AND INNOVATON 234 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan
eds., 1991).
254. Peltzman, supra note 243, passim.
255. CRANDALL Er AL., supra note 31, at 45-79.
256. Peltzman, supra note 243, at 697. Although NHTSA's initial safety standards-includ-
ing seatbelts, energy-absorbing steering columns, penetration-resistant windshields, dual braking
systems, and padded instrument panels-were not formally imposed until 1968, Peltzman argues
that de facto adoption of these standards began by 1964. Id. at 678.
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the post-regulatory period. Peltzman found that the NHTSA standards had
no net impact on death rates, despite their considerable cost.
Peltzman clearly ignored, however, the development of automobile
crashworthiness litigation that coincided with the initial imposition of regu-
lation. More recent work testing Peltzman's conclusions produced quite
different results. Robert Crandall and his colleagues repeated Peltzman's
experiment, using a more complete set of independent variables and, signif-
icantly, nine additional years of post-regulation results. 57 Crandall and his
colleagues found:
Had automobiles been as unsafe in 1981 as in 1965, the esti-
mates ... suggest that total fatalities would have been 18,000 to
22,000 above their actual 1981 level. The estimate of lives saved
per year is about 30 percent of the total deaths that would have
been predicted without safer automobiles. This estimate seems
rather high in light of engineering estimates of the increase in
occupant safety of 10 to 35 percent and our identification of some
offsetting behavior." 8
Thus, where Peltzman had found that fatality reductions were slightly less
than the engineering estimates of the impact of the NHTSA standards
would suggest, Crandall found, over a longer post-regulatory period, that
fatality reductions actually exceeded engineering estimates, even though
driver behavior worked against this trend. As Crandall notes, "Why the
estimate is so high frankly remains something of a puzzle." 9
The obvious culprit in explaining the puzzle, tentatively suggested by
Crandall, is the rising impact of products liability law on automobile
safety.26 Crandall's results strongly imply that another factor influencing
highway safety had developed during the nine additional years included in
Crandall's data.261 As argued earlier in this Article, the crashworthiness
doctrine did not become fully operative until the mid-1970s and had its
257. CRANDALL Er AL., supra note 31, at 68-75.
258. Id. at 69.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 72-73.
261. The bulk of NHTSA safety standards were in place by the end of Peltzman's estimation
period in 1972; however, crashworthiness doctrine was still in an early state of development. For
example, of the 30 states cited in Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977) as
following Larsen (including the "Erie-educated guesses," Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), of various federal courts as to how the relevant state courts might decide such cases) all
but five were decided after 1972-after the end of Peltzman's data set. Of those five, three were
decided in 1971 or before. It is doubtful, therefore, that the crashworthiness doctrine had much
impact on the evaluation of automobile safety captured in Peltzman's data.
If products liability law does play a role, not just in defining standards but also in enforcing
standards imposed by the regulatory agency, the unexpectedly low impact of regulation found in
Peltzman's study might be explained by the failure of tort law to provide an adequate remedial
incentive in the early (pre-crashworthiness-doctrine) period.
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greatest impact on manufacturer behavior after that time. Crandall and his
coauthors suggest that rising products liability risk might have played a role
in the apparent improvement in automobile safety (indeed, they offered no
other explanation), but they suggest no definitive conclusion on the role of
products liability law.262
F. Worker Safety Regulation
More recent studies of the cost of health and safety regulation continue
to ignore the relevance of tort law. Wayne Gray, for example, attempted to
measure the impact of OSHA's worker health and safety regulation and
EPA's environmental regulation on the trend in total factor productivity in
the United States economy. 263 Gray found a "large negative relationship
between such regulation and productivity growth. ' '2 4 His measure of "the
productivity slowdown" for each of 450 United States industries was the
change in average annual total factor productivity between the period 1959-
1969 and the period 1973-1978.265 The 1959-1969 period was chosen to
predate the inception of OSHA and EPA; the 1973-1978 period was chosen
"to ensure that the measures of levels of regulation in the later period would
also measure changes in regulation from the earlier period." 266
Gray used as his dependent variable the change in total factor produc-
tivity growth between those two periods as his dependent variable. He re-
gressed this on an array of independent variables that included OSHA and
EPA expenditures averaged over the post-regulation period. The resulting
coefficients on the regulatory variables were intended to "show the connec-
tion between the regulation measures and the productivity slowdown." 267
Gray concluded that "the regulation measures together account for a slow-
down of .44 percentage points, somewhat over 30 percent of the average
industry's productivity slowdown.' 2 68 Yet Gray included no measure of
the impact of increased tort activism between the two periods. Gray too
262. CRANDALL Er AL., supra note 31, at 72-73.
263. Wayne B. Gray, The Cost of Regulation: OSHA, EPA, and the Productivity Slowdown,
77 Am. EcON. REv. 998 passim (1987). 'Total factor productivity" expresses the relationship
between aggregate output and the sum of all productive inputs; if the growth rate of income is
greater than the sum of the growth rates of all inputs weighted by their initial cost shares, then
total factor productivity has risen." Id. at 999.
264. Id. at 998.
265. The 1959-1969 period was chosen to predate the inception of OSHA and EPA; the 1973-
1978 period was chosen "to ensure that the measures of levels of regulation in the later period
would also measure changes in regulation from the earlier period." Id. at 1001.
266. Id. at 1001.
267. Id. at 1002-03.
268. Id. at 1003.
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may have conflated the impact of regulation with that of tort law and incor-
rectly attributed the combined impact to regulation alone.269
IV. THm ADMINIsTRATIvE BENEFITS OF REGULATION
There has been considerable disenchantment with the products liability
system expressed recently.27 In part, the controversy has focused on the
rationality of tort rules.27' This discussion appears ultimately to be a
controversy over whether tort damages should be understood as a form of
manufacturer-provided insurance for consumers272 or as a deterrence mech-
anism to ensure that manufacturers confront the full costs of risks posed by
their products and thereby minimize unreasonable risks. 3 But current dis-
appointment with tort law extends beyond the basic rules of tort law to the
rationality of the torts process.
Juries are, in this view, capricious, ignorant, and incompetent to evalu-
ate the complex technological decisions made by manufacturers that result
in products liability claims.274 Furthermore, the ex post and unpredictable
nature of jury decisions is said to interfere with the ability of corporate
managers to make reasoned predictions about the possible payoff from in-
vestments in new products and research.275
One frequent suggestion engendered by this dissatisfaction with both
the substantive and procedural nature of current products liability doctrine
is that we rely more heavily on federal regulation of health and safety is-
sues, and correspondingly reduce the role of common-law courts in super-
vising the product safety decisions of manufacturers.276 Advocates of this
position view the regulatory process as an escape from the dangers of tort
law, and suggest that compliance with regulatory requirements should serve
as a defense to a products liability action, at least when the relevant agency
269. Gray concedes, "[T]here could be some other explanation for the slowdown, not in-
cluded in the current set of controls, whose omission biases the regulation coefficients." Id.
270. See, e.g., Uniform Federal Product Liability Law: Hearings on S. 640 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); PRESIDENr's CoUNcIL ON COMPETIrIVE-
Nmss, AGENDA FOR Civii. JusTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 3-5 (Aug. 1991); Andrew Blum, Debate
Still Rages on Torts, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 16, 1992, at 1; Charles R. Epp, Let's Not Kill All the
Lawyers, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1992, at A15; David M. McIntosh, Without Malpractice Reform,
Forget Health-Care Reform, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1993, at A21.
271. See, e.g., Kenneth Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Crisis, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 399
(1987);
272. See, e.g., PAUL H. RUBI, TORT REFoRm BY CONTRACr 29-48 (1993).
273. LANDs & PosNmR, supra note 140, at 23-56.
274. See, e.g., COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY, supra note 12, at 67-98; HUBER, supra note 13,
at 213-15; W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Gov-
ernment Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. REG. 65, 66 (1989).
275. EADs & RErrE, supra note 197, at 1-4.
276. See infra text accompanying note 293.
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has actually examined the product safety issue in question. 77 The trend
toward reading federal regulatory statutes as preemptive, reversing the long-
standing presumption against preemptive interpretations, may reflect judi-
cial sympathy with this approach. 78 Proposals to restrict the collateral
source rule, joint and several liability, damages for pain and suffering, puni-
tive damages, and jury discretion in the calculation of damages,279 similarly
reflect a distrust of the jury system and a desire to reduce the incentives to
litigate.
The desire to place greater power in the hands of federal regulatory
agencies, and to reduce the role of the common-law courts, stands in stark
contrast to the widespread distrust of the regulatory system of a decade ago.
Sympathy for these proposals within the tort reform movement undoubtedly
stems in part from a belief that the total costs to the regulated parties of
complying with agency mandates will be less than the costs they now face
due to potential or actual tort liability. Despite the understandable attrac-
tion of these proposals to the regulated parties themselves, the substitution
of regulation for tort which these proposals would accomplish would solve
few of the problems caused by tort law, as this Article will show, and would
exacerbate the inadequacy of the deterrence offered by the present tort
system.280
Another approach seems clearly preferable. That alternative would
seek to take advantage of the strengths of both tort and regulation by ex-
panding the current regulatory effort without restricting the current tort lia-
bility of manufacturers. An expanded regulatory effort could yield
significant benefits by reducing the risk of irrational jury behavior and by
reducing the high administrative costs associated with tort actions, yet
would pose no risk of reducing the adequacy of the deterrent to unsafe
manufacturer behavior. At the same time, expanding the regulatory effort
would have little cost because, as this Article has noted, the current activist
stance of tort law effectively negates any significant incremental efficiency
cost for a less demanding and largely duplicative regulatory regime. In
short, if we accept that the tort system suffers from some severe imperfec-
tions, we might be well served by seeking ways to improve its operation,
rather than by abandoning it in favor of a regulatory system with severe
problems of its own.
277. See infra text accompanying note 293.
278. Sherman, supra note 11, at 860-64 (noting that federal preemption in the products liabil-
ity field is limited, undertaken on a case-by-case basis).
279. See COMPENSATION AND LiLai.rnr, supra note 12, at 80-96.
280. Teresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by Judiciary, 27 GoNz. L. RPv. 303, 314-
15 (1992).
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A. Regulation as a Substitute for Tort
1. The Reasonableness of Tort Rules
Proposals to adopt a regulatory compliance defense, to allow enhanced
scope for preemption, or otherwise to substitute the judgments of regulatory
agencies for common-law courts, suffer from an obvious flaw: they accept
regulatory standards that are almost inevitably incapable of fully forcing
manufacturers to internalize the costs of their product safety decisions. In-
stead, manufacturers acting under regulatory standards are likely to be able
to avoid a significant share of the costs of injuries stemming from their
products, while themselves reaping the benefits of those decisions in re-
duced manufacturing or design costs.
The reason is inherent in the regulatory process itself: though regula-
tory review ensures against an inefficiently high level of safety mandates,
nothing assures that the level of deterrence will be adequate. Regulatory
policy contains no incentive for agencies to mandate safety precautions
whenever the social benefits of precautions exceed their costs. Yet an effi-
cient level of deterrence requires exactly such a cost-benefit criterion as a
guard against agency inaction as well as against excessive regulation.281
The nature of regulation ensures that agencies will sometimes fail to
act even when action would be cost-justified. The cost-benefit test embod-
ied in Executive Order 12,866282 and in Executive Orders 12,291 and
12,498 in prior administrations, imposes no affirmative duty to regulate,
even when an excess of benefits over costs would be the anticipated re-
sult.283 This policy screens out agency actions that are excessively stringent,
but there is no comparable institution that prevents inadequate stringency.
The systematic hostility to regulation that characterized the last few presi-
dential administrations284 effectively gutted many agencies of resources
and sapped their political will. 85 Continuing distaste in the political system
for regulation286 could resurrect that trend at any time and further disable
the regulatory system. The widely recognized inadequacy of regulatory
remedies and their implicit reliance on tort damages to ensure compli-
281. Peter L. Kahn, Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on Government, 75
CoRNmEL L. Rv. 280, 287-88 (1990).
282. 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
283. See supra note 23.
284. See, e.g., SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & MARTIN TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH TO
DEREcULATE 102-05 (1983); Douglas M. Costle, Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Re-
form, 57 WASH. L. REv. 409, 409-10 (1982).
285. Adler, supra note 119 at 74-76; Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1158-60.
286. See supra note 23.
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ance
2 8 7 further suggest that regulation is not an adequate substitute for tort
law.
The inherently limited budgets of federal agencies ensures that no such
approach could be meaningful in any case. Despite their statutory responsi-
bilities, agencies sometimes fail to act; the vast scope of potential product
risks, the constantly changing array of consumer products and the technol-
ogy which it embodies, and the inherently limited resources available to
agencies, virtually assures that agencies will sometimes fail to act even
when legitimate product risks fall within their jurisdictions.
The jury implements a different standard. Under either the risk-utility
test in strict liability,2"' or the traditional negligence test,289 the defendant is
in principle liable whenever it has failed to take some measure that is justi-
fied by the benefits and that would have prevented the plaintiff's injury.
Even an omniscient jury, appropriately and strictly applying a negligence or
risk-utility test, could find liability despite the defendant's compliance with
all applicable regulations. Juries that hold defendants to higher standards
than did some regulatory agency may just as well be rational juries accu-
rately applying traditional tort liability concepts as irrational juries effec-
tively nullifying their instructions out of sympathy with injured plaintiffs.
The case for the regulatory compliance defense, to the extent that it assumes
that juries unsatisfied by regulatory compliance are simply blinded by prej-
udice or ignorance, misconceives the role of tort liability.
These tort standards of liability are in principle desirable29" and should
be retained. The goal of the negligence standard has long been to encourage
optimal precaution-taking. 291 To adopt the proposed scaling-back of tort
law would effectively abandon these goals in favor of lesser regulatory
standards, perhaps adopted in response to shifting political preferences but
in any case requiring a less-than-optimal level of safety. The real problem,
and the only meaningful case for these proposed reforms, is not that tradi-
287. Howard A. Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers for Failure to
Warn Against Possible Side Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuits From Driving Good Drugs Off
the Market, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 413, 430 (1990).
288. See, e.g., COMPENSATION AND LiAanrr, supra note 12, at 67-98; HUBER, supra note 13,
at 213-15; W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Gov-
ernment Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON RE. 65, 66
(1989).
289. See McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1556-57 (7th Cir. 1987); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
290. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 140, at 312 ("We do not contend that all rules of tort
law are efficient-only that most are.... We argue that the law creates incentives for parties to
behave efficiently ....").
291. Id. at 4-9 (discussing historical roots of view that tort law should "deter[ ] conduct that is
not justifiable on utilitarian grounds").
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tional concepts of tort are wrong; rather, it is the possibility the jury will
disregard, misunderstand, or be unable to apply its instructions, and find
liability when it should not.292 In short, the problem of monitoring govern-
mental decisionmakers to ensure compliance with desired norms is a prob-
lem whether one is dealing with agencies or juries. Reforms that enhance
the role of regulation but reduce the importance of the tort system, ignore
that fact.293
2. A Catalog of Complaints
Other problems with the current tort system that supposedly justify a
reduction of the scope or role of tort law are numerous. W. Kip Viscusi,294
among others, suggests that the role of tort be made "subsidiary" to alterna-
tive institutions designed to reduce risk and provide compensation because,
in his view, tort tends to function comparatively poorly in the products lia-
bility context; he suggests, among other things, the adoption of a regulatory
compliance defense.295 Yet many of the problems that Viscusi identifies
with the tort system are as well or better addressed by expanding the regula-
tory regime to supplement the existing tort system, rather than contracting
the limits of tort law to meet the boundaries of existing regulation. For
example:
a. Scope of Risk Coverage
Viscusi argues that, because the tort system poses significant problems
for plaintiffs seeking compensation, the tort system "provides compensation
for only a subset of all injuries. '296 These problems arise, in his view, in
satisfying the legal tests for liability, such as demonstrating "negligence,"
"defect," or "cause."
Yet if the problem is the inadequacy of tort law as a compensatory
mechanism, surely further reducing the scope of tort law is inappropriate,
unless some alternative compensation system is to be substituted for it; and
292. See MoLLY SELVIN & LARRY Picus, DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS
FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE 52-54 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice No. R-3479-ICJ, 1987)
(detailing research suggesting that juries often forget, misunderstand, or fail to follow the judge's
instructions).
293. It is possible that juries will ignore the risk-utility test and find liability despite compli-
ance with an adequate regulation. On the other hand, it is also possible that the legislature will fail
to formulate an adequate standard, and that a jury appropriately applying a risk-utility test will be
justified in finding liability. The problem of inadequate legislative action is an old one, rooted in
what could be described as the public-choice-related problems of industry "capture" and failure to
act except in cases of significant political attention. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 875-78 (1987).
294. Viscusi, supra note 240.
295. Id. at 105.
296. Id. at 69.
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unless the compensatory mechanism is taxpayer-funded rather than funded
(as tort compensation now is) by contribution from the injurer, similar legal
barriers are likely to exist to protect alleged injurers from wrongful claims.
These tests are intended to deter illegitimate claims. While it is not a per-
fect solution, an invigorated regulatory regime could significantly mitigate
this problem. As a regulatory agency sets higher standards for behavior,
more plaintiffs are likely to qualify for compensation because of the doc-
trine of negligence per se. Further, a plaintiff's incentives to overcome ex-
isting procedural hurdles rise because of the enhanced possibility of
obtaining punitive damages, since a regulatory violation becomes more
likely as regulatory standards rise. Enhanced regulatory standards also can
reduce the risk of injury and lessen reliance on the tort system without pos-
ing greater obstacles to plaintiffs who have been injured.
b. The Problem of Information
Another inadequacy of the tort system that Viscusi identifies similarly
works to place burdens on plaintiffs. Tort liability places high burdens on
parties to generate information. To make out her case, a plaintiff must have
information about the cost of possible safety measures the defendant could
have taken and about the information available to the defendant before the
accident occurred.297
Again, an enhanced role for regulatory agencies mitigates that prob-
lem. Agencies collect significant amounts of information about risks, causa-
tion, and remedies in the normal course of their activities. A more vigorous
regulatory regime is likely to increase the information publicly available to
plaintiffs and courts for this purpose, and make it easier for plaintiffs to rely
on a negligence per se theory of fault.
c. Risk Reduction Incentives
Viscusi notes that tort damages provide optimal deterrence as long as
potential defendants correctly anticipate damage awards,298 but a variety of
problems prevent accurate foresight. Damage awards neglect injuries to
third parties; furthermore, speculative firms, or firms facing potential bank-
ruptcy, tend to have short time horizons; and damage awards may be inac-
curate. 299 For these reasons, tort damages may be too low, leading firms to
take less than the cost-justified level of care.
Yet, as argued in this Article, regulatory standards are often even less
stringent than tort standards. Furthermore, as Viscusi suggests, agencies
297. Id. at 71-76.
298. Id. at 82.
299. Id. at 83.
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consistently underenforce their regulations. 3" The concerns which result
from the fact that the tort system gives insufficient risk-reduction incentives
are obviously not addressed by an alternative which provides even less ade-
quate incentives. It seems far more sensible to leave the tort system in place
than to rely instead on hortatory efforts to improve the behavior of the regu-
latory agencies. If both the tort system and regulation each separately pro-
vide inadequate incentives, better to allow the two to operate together with
the goal of approximating accuracy than to abandon one in the hopes that
the other can be improved.
d. Institutional Overlap
Viscusi notes, curiously, that tort liability "creates inefficient incen-
tives because of the manner in which it determines damages,' 30 1 and sug-
gests that the problem is one of institutional overlap, in which both tort and
regulation affect risk reduction incentives for the same economic activity.
Viscusi suggests reducing institutional overlap by allowing expanded de-
fenses to liability, such as expanding the defense of assumption of risk and
by allowing a regulatory compliance defense.3 2 What is curious about this
alleged problem is that the "inefficient incentives" to which Viscusi alludes
are actually inefficiently low incentives for risk reduction in the tort sys-
tem.30 3 Although Viscusi points to instances of excessively stringent regula-
tory rules as justifying a restriction of tort law, apparently on the grounds
that the concurrent sanctions worsen the already excessive stringency im-
posed by regulation alone,3° he also points to the reality that government
enforcement is notoriously too lax.30 5
e. Adequacy of Compensation
Viscusi rightly notes that tort damages frequently fail to compensate
plaintiffs fully for their injuries,30 6 and he suggests that an entirely different
mechanism, such as social insurance which "mimics" workmen's compen-
sation, be substituted for tort damages as a compensation mechanism. 30 7 Of
course, the legislature could instead mandate increased tort damages to en-
sure adequate compensation. Any compensation mechanism that pays more
300. Id. at 91-92.
301. Id. at 99.
302. Id. at 100.
303. Id.at 99, n. 181. The text to which Viscusi refers suggests that tort incentives are inef-
ficiently low.
304. Id. at 99
305. Id. at 91-92.
306. Id. at 97.
307. Id. at 98.
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generous awards to injured parties should produce a similar increase in
claims.
B. Regulation as a Supplement to Tort
Regulation can supplement the tort system in at least two important
ways, and by doing so lower the total administrative costs of enforcing a
minimum level of product safety while incurring only minor incremental
cost. First, the regulatory agency can serve to supplement the jury's techni-
cal expertise; and second, regulatory rules can provide a level of clarity and
direction to private parties such that injuries can be prevented without reli-
ance on the costly administrative mechanism of the tort system.
1. The Regulatory Agency as a Pool of Technical Expertise
Proposals for tort reform, in essence, attempt to address issues of con-
trolling and overseeing the discretion of the jury, ensuring that the jury has
a reasonably well-informed view of the problem and an understanding of
why a knowledgeable decisionmaker acting in a cost-benefit context might
or might not mandate the particular safety precaution urged by plaintiff.
Although courts are capable of overseeing and controlling juries, expert
regulatory agencies can offer a different form of assistance to the factfinder.
Agencies can provide information and informed analysis that may or
may not lead the agency to regulate, but which can help a jury, applying
different decision criteria, decide whether or not it should find liability.
Regulatory agencies not only prevent injuries, which reduces the need to
litigate cases,3"' but also provide information justifying their actions or fail-
ure to act, information that can reduce the cost of litigating and reduce the
possibility of jury error. By making the agency's decision process available
to the jury confronting related issues, regulation can and should play a role
in enhancing the rationality of tort outcomes.
The reasoning process of a regulatory agency, if available to a jury,
could aid the jury in confronting the "unusually complex, highly technical
analysis" with which they reportedly have problems.3 09 Plaintiffs have in-
centives to introduce at trial agency decisions to regulate, to the extent the
regulation is relevant to liability; reasoned and articulated decisions by the
agency not to go further to include the design aspects suggested by plaintiff
should be of considerable value to a defendant's case. Because agencies
and juries implement different legal standards, however, the agency's deci-
308. See infra text accompanying notes 320-58.
309. James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.I. 467, 479 (1976).
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sion whether to proceed on the issue in question should not determine the
jury's decision.
Documentation suggesting the reasoning process of agencies could be
made available to the parties in court. Government reports are normally
admissible into evidence under Rule 403310 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence,311 so long as the evidence is not excludable as hearsay under Rule
802. 312 Furthermore, factual findings from government "[r]ecords, reports,
statements, or data compilations" are normally admissible under an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule,3 13 so long as the "circumstances" surrounding the
material do not "indicate a lack of trustworthiness." Reports produced in
the normal course of the business of a regulatory agency are typically ad-
missible under this rule,314 and could be relied upon by juries to aid the
determination of whether or not conduct was negligent or a product was
"unreasonably dangerous, 315 so long as the report is of direct relevance to
the issues being litigated.316
310. FED. R. EvilD. 403.
311. See Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978).
312. FED. R. Evm. 802.
313. FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(C).
314. See Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1975)
(admitting Federal Aviation Administration advisory materials as exception to hearsay rule be-
cause of indicia of reliability).
315. KEETON ET AL., supra note 37, § 103, at 713.
316. Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602, 608-9 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
910 (1958). The Notes of the Advisory Committee on the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
suggest that the factors which affect "trustworthiness" and hence admissibility include, of most
relevance here, any "possible motivation problems suggested by" those presented in Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). JAMEs W. MooRE Er AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 803.8,
at 322 (1987).
In Palmer, a railroad was sued in a diversity action for injuries sustained in a grade-crossing
accident that the plaintiff alleged was caused by the railroad's negligent failure to provide warning
signals. Id. at 110. The railroad held an investigation, during which the engineer of the train (who
died prior to trial) was interviewed by a railroad superintendent. Id. The railroad then sought to
introduce into evidence the transcript of the engineer's statement. The Supreme Court held the
transcript was not admissible, even though it was the usual practice of the railroad to hold investi-
gations after accidents, because the investigation was not made "in the regular course of any
business." Id. at 111 n.1. The statutory rule of evidence that the Court applied stated: "[A]ny
writing or record... made as a memorandum or record of any act.., shall be admissible as
evidence of said act ... if it shall appear that it was made in the regular course of any business,
and that it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the
time of such act." Id. (quoting Act of June 20, 1936, 49 Stat. 1561).
Reports of the investigation were not admissible, the Court ruled, because they were "for use
essentially in the court, not in the business. Their primary utility is in litigating, not in the busi-
ness." Id. at 114. Regulatory actions justified in part by their possible value in the litigation
process might be said to violate this criterion of trustworthiness.
That, however, is not so. Government regulatory reports are made, not in the process of
preparing for any specific litigation, but prior to the event that gives rise to the litigation. The
parties to subsequent litigation are not be known at the time the report is issued. The report in
Palmer was prepared by one of the parties itself, while government reports have a considerably
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Giving the parties more regulatory workproduct on which to rely can
also promote the predictability of outcomes and thus the deterrent effect of
tort law.317 Identification of a product safety issue by the agency may help
corporate managers reduce exposure to liability. The need to comply with
governmental regulatory edicts will clarify risks to corporate managers. The
threat of punitive damages associated with the possible violation of regula-
tory standards provides further reason to clarify the transmission of signals
through corporate bureaucracy; liability risks sometimes are not perceived
by those responsible for product design decisions. 1 8 Furthermore, regula-
tory violation can be used to establish liability, thereby reducing the need to
litigate issues of due care and reducing the administrative cost of the tort
system.
2. Using Regulation to Prevent Litigation
One way in which regulation may lower the costs of the tort system is
by preventing injuries that would otherwise be litigated. Tort law relies on
after-the-fact deterrence, in which the risk of liability encourages the de-
sired behavior.3" 9 Regulation, on the other hand, bans undesired behavior
directly. If litigation is more costly than the incremental administrative cost
greater aura of impartiality. Such reports, not prepared for any particular case but instead for all
cases germane to the subject of the report, cannot have the overtone of bias that the report in
Palmer obviously carried.
The alternative to relying on a jury, in any case, whatever its problems, is to rely on agencies
with their own shortcomings pursuing a different agenda. If an agency is biased in the preparation
of a report made for possible use in some future litigation, there is no reason it will not also be
biased in its explicitly regulatory decisions. The jury similarly may be inflamed, biased, or un-
willing to adhere to the limits of formal tort doctrine in assigning liability; but the evidence sug-
gests that juries are in fact less willing than the appellate courts that review their actions to find
liability.
In fact, the evidence from trials suggests that defendants win at trial in products liability
cases considerably more frequently than plaintiffs do, and that judgments in favor of plaintiffs are
more frequently reversed on appeal. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New Light on
Punitive Damages, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 33. According to Landes and Posner, this
suggests that, "if products liability law is becoming more expansive and favorable to plaintiffs'
claims, this may be due more to changes in the standards of liability applied by appellate courts
than to increased jury sympathy for accident victims or other factors affecting products liability
trials." Id. at 35.
317. Stephen Sugarman suggests that the unpredictability of tort outcomes is one factor which
undermines the deterrent effect of tort law. Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Personal
Injury Law, in PERPEcTrvFs oN TORT LAw 126, 131-32 (Robert L. Rabin ed., 1990).
318. See EArs & REUTER, supra note 197, at 2-4.
319. One theoretical way to create strong incentives to deterrence is to use sufficiently large
sanctions. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 171-73 (1968). Whether juries would be willing to impose extremely high sanctions
for this purpose is questionable; whether those sanctions would be constitutional is also open to
question. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources, 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718-20 (1993); Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 9-12, 18 (1991).
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of regulating, regulation presents an opportunity to reduce the volume, as
well as the cost, of litigating.
How large these savings might be has never, apparently, been esti-
mated. Yet there are no such estimates. Cost-benefit studies of regulation
did not consider administrative costs a significant element of the desirabil-
ity of regulation, since such costs did not normally even enter the analy-
sis,32 ° just as these studies did not consider the tort system as interacting
with regulation. And estimates of the costs and benefits of regulation-
including the benefits in terms of numbers of injuries prevented-have
taken no account at all of the role of the existing tort system.
This Part attempts two alternative estimates of the litigation cost that
regulation can prevent. These estimates are admittedly crude; their purpose
is not to suggest a definitive number, but only to suggest that there may be
significant savings available.
The first of these begins with existing estimates of the injuries that
automobile safety regulation prevents, 321 and asks, In the absence of that
regulation to prevent injuries, how many lawsuits would those injuries gen-
erate, and how much would those lawsuits cost? Put differently, it asks:
What would it cost simply to handle through the courts the injuries that
automobile safety regulation now prevent? That figure will then be com-
pared to the administrative costs of preventing those accidents by regula-
tion. The figure suggests the cost impact the elimination of regulation might
have in raising the total administrative costs of the system.
An alternative estimate will then be attempted. Using estimates of the
costs of complying with automobile safety regulatory requirements, and as-
suming that none of those costs are legitimately attributable to tort deter-
rence, the Article asks: How many additional torts cases (in the absence of
regulation) would it take to persuade auto manufacturers to increase their
safety expenditures to the level of expenditures now mandated by regula-
tion? And what would it cost to litigate those cases? While the first esti-
mate assumes that safety expenditures fall by the amount mandated by
regulation alone and asks what it would cost to litigate the resulting injuries,
320. Typical of this treatment of alternative administrative costs as peripheral to the real issues
in evaluating regulation is Linneman's decision simply not to include them:
The direct costs of the mattress flammability standard are composed of CPSC ad-
ministrative costs and the increase in mattress prices attributable to the standard. In the
absence of accurate intra-agency information on administrative costs, this section [enti-
tled "Costs of the Mattress Flammability Standard"] concentrates solely on the latter
effect.
Linneman, supra note 237, at 471. In light of Linneman's failure to account for the interaction
with the tort system in evaluating the CPSC's flammability standard, the failure to include admin-
istrative costs becomes reasonable.
321. CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 31, at 69.
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the second estimate assumes that safety expenditures are to be restored to
their initial level through the incentives of the tort system, and asks what it
would cost, in terms of additional litigation expense, to induce all the safety
expenditures now made in response to regulation. Both estimates implicitly
assume that all injuries which Crandall claims NHTSA regulation prevents
in fact are prevented by regulation alone, and are not at all attributable to
existing tort incentives; in other words, it takes seriously the view implicit
in Crandall's study that tort incentives played no part in preventing any of
the injuries Crandall claims regulation prevented.
a. Estimate 1: Handling Injuries Prevented by Regulation Through
the Courts
In their study of the impact of NHTSA standards, Crandall and his
colleagues suggest that "[h]ad automobiles been as unsafe in 1981 as in
1965, the estimates ... suggest that total fatalities would have been 18,000
to 22,000 above their actual 1981 level."32 Though Crandall and his coau-
thors offer these numbers as estimates of the benefits of regulation, they
concede that other factors, possibly the tort system, may have contributed to
the decline in traffic fatalities.323 However, the autonomous effect of
changes in consumer demand for safety (and thus changes in the number of
fatalities that would be generated independently through the market mecha-
nism) is theoretically embodied in their estimated regression coefficients 324
for wage rates and income.31
Because it appears that Crandall's estimate of the reduction in fatalities
is at least a partial overestimate of the separate impact of regulation, let us
assume that half of the estimated reduction in fatalities, or about 10,000
lives saved, is independently attributable to NHTSA regulation alone. This
number is consistent with engineering estimates of the benefits of NHTSA
safety standards 326 and with NHTSA's own estimates of lives saved
through NHTSA standards.327
The next step is to ask how many of those deaths (had they occurred)
would be actionable against automobile or automobile parts manufacturers.
Of course, there is no sure way to tell; as Saks notes, "separating accidental
injuries into those which are tortious and those whose costs must remain
322. Id.
323. Id. at 72.
324. See BARNES supra note 196, at 293-294 (explaining regression coefficients).
325. For a discussion of this point, see Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regu-
lation, 83 J. POL. EcoN. 677, 688 (1975), the results of which Crandall et al. try in their own work
to test and extend.
326. See CRANDALL Er AL., supra note 31, at 51-55, 69.
327. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFic SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY
TRENDS AND FORECASTS 1 (Oct. 1981).
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with the injury victim is something that is rarely even attempted."32 Ap-
parently no studies on automobile injuries exist, but such studies do exist
for medical malpractice. 329 As a percentage of all hospitalized patients,
those suffering negligent iatrogenic 330 injuries, as found by medical investi-
gators, ranged between 0.79% and 2.18%.3 31 However, as a percentage only
of those suffering iatrogenic injuries, those suffering injuries due to negli-
gence is a much higher number; the data provided by the Harvard study
332
suggests the percentage of negligence victims in the population of ia-
trogenic injury victims is some 27.6%.333 In the absence of any alternative
numbers, let us assume the proportion of accidents attributable to actionable
negligence based on unreasonable design allegations is of the same approxi-
mate magnitude.334 Related evidence suggests the percentage of such inju-
ries in some contexts may be considerably higher.335 Taking 25% as an
estimate of the share of actual injuries attributable to negligence, approxi-
mately 2500 of the deaths we have assumed are prevented annually by
NHTSA standards might have had actionable claims against automobile
manufacturers had those standards not existed.
Of those 2500 potentially actionable claims, how many would actually
result in a claim that would in some way enter the products liability system?
Evidence here suggests the percentage of actionable claims actually filed is
consistently quite low. One study finds that around 10% of negligently in-
jured patients sought compensation 336; another suggests a number of 6%337;
328. Saks, supra note 1, at 1176.
329. HARVARD MEDICAL PRAcTIcE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK, THE REPORT OF
THE HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY TO THE STATE OF NEw YORK 3 (1990) [hereinafter
HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY]; LEON S. POCINCKI Er AL., THE INCIDENCE OF IATROGENIc
INjumEs 50, 55 (1973). There is no question that reliance on medical malpractice statistics may
give a misleading impression of the behavior of automobile accident victims. In the absence of
data pertinent to those cases, however, I will assume for present purposes that their behavior is
roughly similar.
330. latrogenic injuries are those caused by medical or surgical treatment. Saks, supra note 1,
at 1178 n.86 (citing STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 759 (25th ed. 1990)).
331. See supra note 328.
332. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACnCE STUDY, supra note 329, at 3-4.
333. Id. at 3. Saks suggests this may be an underestimate because the Harvard investigators
may have been overly cautious in ascribing injuries to practitioner negligence. Saks, supra note 1,
at 1178 n.85.
334. Crandall's estimates are of injuries prevented by regulation; thus, in principle, they do
not include automobile accidents caused by factors other than those regulated by NHTSA. This is
largely a matter of automobile design. Thus, I assume the injuries that would occur in the absence
of NHTSA regulation are related to design issues rather than to driver negligence.
335. Saks, supra note 1, at 1179-80 & n.92.
336. Patricia Danzon notes that this rate rose to around 20% between the mid-1970s and the
mid-1980s. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Malpractice Claims: New Evi-
dence, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 57, 68.
337. Saks, supra note 1, at 1178-80.
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a third suggests that 18.7% of tortious injuries are litigated.33 Let us pick a
middle estimate and assume that about 10% of actionable claims result in
legal action. If so, then our 2500 actionable injuries become 250 lawsuits.
What would be the social cost of those lawsuits? James Kakalik and
Nicholas Pace3 39 suggest that the total costs of tort litigation in state and
federal courts in 1985, not inclusive of compensation paid to plaintiffs, 3
40
came to between $15.5 billion and $19 billion.34 1 Kakalik and Pace esti-
mate there were some 866,000 torts cases terminated in state and federal
courts of general jurisdiction in 1985.342 The average torts case, therefore,
had an approximate net cost to society of between $17,900 and $22,200 in
that year. Multiplying these respective average costs per torts case times the
estimated number of automobile fatality cases prevented in 1985 of 250
yields an estimate of litigation costs avoided of between $4.5 million and
$5.5 million per year in automobile fatality cases alone.
There are no estimates of non-fatal injuries preventable by improved
automobile safety comparable to the estimates by Crandall and his coau-
thors for fatal injuries prevented. NHTSA, however, has estimated the
number of motor vehicle-related injuries for 1979-80;141 the ratio of non-
fatal injuries to fatal injuries, based on NHTSA's numbers, is about 77:1.
Crandall suggests this ratio may need adjustment because crash-protection
regulation tends to reduce the severity of injuries, thus reducing fatalities
only at the cost of increasing the number of non-fatal injuries;3 " if so, then
in the absence of regulation there would be relatively fewer non-fatal inju-
ries, and that ratio would be lower. On the other hand, Saks points out that,
in the context of medical malpractice, "[m]oderately to severely injured
malpractice victims were between two and three times more likely to file
malpractice suits than families of those who died from negligent inju-
ries. 3 45 If this translates to the automobile litigation context, then the ratio
of suits in nonfatal cases to suits in fatal cases would be considerably higher
338. See id. at 1184.
339. KAKALIK & PACE, supra note 16, at 68-69.
340. Compensation awards from defendants or their insurers to plaintiffs are irrelevant to the
comparative social cost of regulation and the tort system because the awards are simply a transfer
of resources and do not represent a net cost to society.
341. KAKALIK & PACE, supra note 16, at 69 tbl. 7.3. These expenditures, after netting out
compensation paid to plaintiffs, include "legal fees and related expenses of both plaintiffs and
defendants, insurance company claims-processing costs for claims in suit, the value of litigants'
time spent, and the costs of operating the court system for these cases." Id. at 66.
342. Id.
343. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE ECONOMIC COST
TO SOCIETY OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 11-2-18, DOT HS-806-342 (1983).
344. CRANDALL Er AL., supra note 31, at 76.
345. Saks, supra note 1, at 1187 (citing CALIFORNIA MEDICAL Ass'N & CALIFORNIA HosP.
AsS'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY (Don H. Mills ed. 1977)).
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than the ratio of nonfatal injuries to injuries; multiplying the tort-litigation-
cost saving in fatal automobile injury cases by 77 would result in a consid-
erable underestimate. Let us assume simply that the proper number lies
between 50 and 100. This results in an obviously speculative estimate of
annual tort litigation costs saved because of the existence of NHTSA safety
regulations of between $230 million and $555 million.
As compared to these numbers, there appears to be a clear savings in
administrative cost by relying on NHTSA regulation to prevent those inju-
ries. The entire administrative budget of NHTSA in fiscal year 1985 was
$100.4 million,346 or less than half the administrative costs that would have
been necessary to handle the resulting volume of cases through the courts
had NHTSA's safety standards not existed.
b. Estimate 2: Achieving the Same Safety Expenditures as
Regulation
Let us again assume that all of the estimated engineering costs3 4 7 asso-
ciated with NHTSA regulations are attributable to NHTSA alone. If
NHTSA's safety requirements disappeared overnight and the industry could
costlessly scale up or down its safety expenditures to its profit-maximizing
point, none of those safety costs would be required, either by the now-
vanished regulatory regime, the unchanged tort regime, nor by market de-
mand (since by assumption those engineering costs were attributable only
to NHTSA). Assume industry can avoid tort liability by adopting safety
expenditures. Our question then is this: Assuming no change per case in the
cost of litigating or in expected damage awards, how many additional torts
cases would be required to produce the original level of safety expenditure,
the expenditures that were made in response to the regulatory regime which
has (by hypothesis) disappeared? Once we have an answer to that question,
we can ask about the administrative cost of achieving that level of dollar
expenditure on automobile safety alternatively by the current regulatory
system or by an expanded tort regime.
My method is this. First, let us ask what it currently costs automobile
manufacturers to comply with all applicable NHTSA safety requirements.
Assuming risk neutralitY34 8 by automobile manufacturers, and assuming
that tort substantive behavioral standards are the same as those now man-
dated by NHTSA, this Article asks how many additional litigated cases are
346. BUDGET OF THE UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT I-Q14 (1986).
347. I mean to include here all of the costs associated with implementing NHTSA safety
regulations, not just the expenditures on engineering services.
348. For an explanation of risk neutrality, see CHARLES J. Gorz, LAW AND ECONOMICS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 79 (1984).
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necessary to produce expected liability costs349 by manufacturers of this
same amount. To answer that question, the average cost to defendants of
litigating a torts lawsuit including average damages is found, and the total
required liability expense is divided by the current average cost per case to
defendants to find the number of cases required to produce the necessary
total cost to defendants. That number of cases is then multiplied by the cost-
to-society per average case (which is net of damages payments but inclusive
of costs to courts, plaintiffs, and defendants), to produce the administrative
cost of generating by tort enforcement alone the same level of safety ex-
penditures as results from current NHTSA safety regulation.
Crandall and his coauthors have estimated the current engineering
costs to manufacturers of complying with all current NHTSA safety regula-
tions.350 To get these estimates, they combine U.S. General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO) figures for the years 1966 through 1974 on the engineering cost
of new safety standards with annual estimates of the incremental cost of
new standards derived by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 351 They then
adjust these figures for inflation, and for learning that reduces the annual
cost of compliance for pre-existing requirements.352 Based on these adjust-
ments they derive an estimate of total compliance costs of safety regulation
in 1984 of $491 per automobile produced in that year.353 There were some
7.7 million new passenger cars produced in the United States in 1984,3s4 for
a total compliance cost for automobile production of $3.78 billion in 1984
dollars.
If NHTSA-mandated safety precautions are indeed entirely separate
from what automobile manufacturers are now induced to spend on safety by
tort liability, and manufacturers are risk neutral (so that the uncertainty as-
sociated with tort litigation does not by itself change the desired level of
expenditures), how much would have to be spent in tort litigation costs to
achieve that same level of compliance expenditures? Those expenditures
are incremental or additional to the safety expenditures manufacturers are
now induced to make by the tort system.355 This should be equal to their
expected liability costs if they fail to implement the same safety
precautions.
349. For an explanation of expected values, see BARNES, supra note 196, at 80.
350. CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 31, at 37 tbl. 3-4.
351. Id. at 33.
352. Id. at 36-37.
353. Id. at 37 tbl. 3-4.
354. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BuREAu OF TH CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSMACr oF' THra
UNITED STATEs 608 tbl. 1034 (1991).
355. This is probably unrealistic, since NHTSA standards, as with most government mandates,
tend to be floors and not ceilings for tort liability. See supra notes 20-194 and accompanying text.
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Kakalik and Pace estimate that all tort litigation in 1985 cost defend-
ants a total of between $28.7 billion and $35.1 billion, including between
$8.0 billion and $10.0 billion of litigation costs and between $20.7 billion
and $25.1 billion of total compensation to plaintiffs. 356 Dividing that figure
by 866,000 tort lawsuits in that year in both state and federal courts of
general jurisdiction,357 each lawsuit costs defendants between $33,000 and
$41,000. Let us assume this is what each new lawsuit will cost defendants
when current regulation is removed.
To achieve additional expected liability cost of an additional $3.78 bil-
lion (the current total regulatory compliance costs for automobile produc-
tion in the United States), if each suit can be expected to cost defendants
between $33,000 and $41,000, then between 93,000 and 117,000 new cases
will be required to induce the same safety precautions. Multiplying these
additional case numbers by RAND's estimated social cost per tort suit (i.e.
litigation costs to both sides plus court costs, exclusive of damage awards)
of between $17,000 and $22,000 yields a range of results between $1.5
billion and $2.5 billion in administrative costs to achieve through the tort
system the same level of safety as is currently provided by NHTSA.
If regulation in fact has the ability to prevent injuries without depend-
ing on the relatively expensive administrative mechanism of tort deterrence,
then a potentially significant new element of benefit is added to the cost-
benefit equation. The result may well be a more activist regulatory regime,
with associated benefits in enhancing the rationality of jury decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Tort law affects the true costs of health and safety regulation, yet its
impact has been obscured. The unaccounted-for interaction between federal
regulation and products liability law has led to an overstatement of the cost
of regulation, excessive optimism about the potential benefits of deregula-
tion, and devaluation of public-sector remedies for health and safety issues.
Modem health and safety regulation developed coincidentally with the
major growth in products liability law between the early 1960s and the late
1970s. In choosing policy, we wrongly relied on estimates of regulatory
cost that included not just the cost of regulation but also the cost of the
more expansive products liability regime that developed concurrently with
it. For that reason, we have an excessively negative view of the total cost of
governmental efforts to affect product safety.
Furthermore, we have misunderstood the nature of the benefits pro-
vided by the regulatory system. In those cases in which tort rules supersede
356. KAKALUK & PACE, supra note 16, at 69, tbl. 7.3.
357. Id. at 66.
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or offset regulatory mandates, the impact of regulation on the allocation of
private resources is probably small. The real benefits of regulation are dif-
ferent: regulation reduces the costs of operating and maintaining the tort
system.
Our measurements of regulatory costs and benefits are tainted by the
failure to appreciate the historical coincidence that has given us a dual sys-
tem of regulation. Their interplay will critically 'determine the effects of
changing either tort law or federal health and safety regulation. Until we
recognize the true choices we face, we will be unable to make policy
choices that mean what we think they mean.
